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 This study reports the findings of a systematic visual content analysis of 356 
randomly sampled images published about the Iraq War in Time, Newsweek, and U.S. 
News and World Report from 2003-2009. In comparison to a 1995 Gulf War study, 
published images in all three newsmagazines continued to be U.S.-centric, with the 
highest content frequencies reflected in the categori s U.S. troops on combat patrol, Iraqi 
civilians, and U.S. political leaders respectively. These content categories do not 
resemble the results of the Gulf War study in which armaments garnered the largest share 
of the images with 23%. 
 This study concludes that embedding photojournalists, n addition to media 
economics, governance, and the media-organizational culture, restricted an accurate 
representation of the Iraq War and its consequences. Embedding allowed more access to 
both troops and civilians than the journalistic pool system of the Gulf War, which 
stationed the majority of journalists in Saudi Arabia and allowed only a few journalists 
into Iraq with the understanding they would share information. However, the perceived 
opportunity by journalists to more thoroughly cover the war through the policy of 
embedding was not realized to the extent they had hoped for. The embed protocols acted 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a 
matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, 
unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest.  
 
                       ~ Michel Foucault (1981) 
 
It seems almost perverse to have a personal fascination with war photography. I 
have a certain guilt associated with viewing images of humans in extremis. Even the 
Latin is a way to distance myself from what I do, which is actually to look at photographs 
of the maimed and dead, the displaced, the abandoned as well as the rubble and human 
cost of war. There is something about the representatio s of war and what I feel is 
missing, that must be there beyond the camera’s view that draws me in. It might simply 
be the question of how we continue to believe that war can be an honorable endeavor, 
particularly when we see and are aware of our own culpability in the perpetration of its 
life-altering pain and suffering. My brother served during the Vietnam War and I was 
distraught at the thought he might be killed and I would never see him again. There are 
many families that have experienced the heartache and fear and also the pride of having a 
family member enlist or be drafted. Stories of war, movies about war, and photographs of 
war depict acts of heroism as a defining war experience, yet soldiers themselves claim 
they do not feel like “heroes.” Stories of the special amaraderie of fellow servicemen 
and women that is never surpassed outside the military are common. Over the years I 
have come to understand that conflating war and heroism is a mistake. Heroism, acts of 
courage, and bravery are certainly present during wartime, but they are not only 




experiences of war. Heroism is part of a narrative surrounding war that serves a purpose 
for a stakeholder. Much more realistic, or holistic, is a representation of war as a cost to 
the environment and all beings—and heroism is a spandrel, or byproduct, of a desperate 
situation. I suspect there are other cultural narratives in our depictions of war for which 
the photograph acts as proof or evidence. In this sen e photographs do not represent 
“war”  per se, but rather are selected to represent our myths about war or our narrative 
interests. The term “war” has become an indexical attribution of meaning, a process of 
bracketing an event and separating it from its context so that in future references to the 
event, the “meaning” that was originally derived from the event “becomes” the event 
instead of a part of a complex series of interrelated events. This points to a practice of 
contemporary journalism to report episodically without a broader causal anchoring 
(Iyengar, 1991). In this way, the indexicalization f events become evidence of the 
meaning of war, thus conflating causal and indexing processes (Tuchman, 1978). 
It is all the more important to recognize and deepen th  understanding of the 
human cost of war when what is represented in the media does not frame it as a human 
endeavor, but focuses instead on the technological innovations and means of war or 
textual and visual tropes about war that have been culturally anchored in the war 
narrative. In a study of the 1991 Gulf War, Griffin a d Lee (1995) found that 23% of 
pictorial coverage focused on weapons systems and technology. This was a significant 
change from previous wars, and one that literally replaced the percentage of imagery 
traditionally dedicated to warfare with images of “American military technology and 




power” (Griffin & Lee, 1995, p. 817). I replicated and extended Griffin and Lee’s content 
analysis of Gulf War images by performing a content analysis of images representing the 
Iraq War. The study was conducted in two stages. Fir t, the content analysis of manifest 
content of media images was coded, and the results of the coding were compared with the 
original study to see whether the predominance of armament coverage discovered by 
Griffin and Lee continued for the Iraq War. Second, the content frequencies that emerged 
from the content analysis were interpreted as a discursive archive of a journalistic 
institution (Rose, 2001, p. 164), a visual culture particular to that institution’s structure 
and procedures with implications for our contemporary understanding of war. 
 First, I review the literature on framing, and war and the media in particular, 
situating my study as an empirical study replicating a d extending the 1995 Gulf War 
study conducted by Griffin and Lee. I detail the methodology and results of Griffin and 
Lee’s study, and the implications suggested by the resultant findings. I then discuss how I 
collected and coded the images of the Iraq War, how I analyzed the resultant data set, and 
discuss the implications of the results. 
 
  




Chapter 2: Review of Literature 
 The first things we see when we read an article are the images related to the story. 
Eye-tracking studies suggest that the most dominant photograph on a page is the point at 
which attention is directed first, with visually salient and larger photographs leading a 
reader into a story (Olk & Kappas, 2011; Smith, 2005). Images have the power to draw 
us into the story and in conjunction with the headlines and captions help to frame how we 
interpret and make meaning of the subject matter. Bcause photographs lack formal 
propositional syntax, that anchors an image to onlye particular meaning (Borah, 
2009), images can be persuasive rhetorical tools in support of many different texts and in 
activating cultural schemata (Newton, 2001; Perlmutter, 1998). Therefore war 
photography is not a transparent medium, it is a moment in time onto which meaning is 
constructed or vested. Framing is a practice through which meaning can be assigned to a 
photograph through text, and also a methodology through which photography can be 
analyzed for meaning construction. 
Framing Literature 
 Framing theory and framing research have developed v r the past decade by 
reflexively defining and refining what framing is a communication theory and 
methodological approach (Tannen, 1993). Researchers have yet to agree on how to define 
and research framing. Some confusion stems from the inability to agree on a consistent 
vocabulary and the resultant ambiguity in a term’s eaning, and part of the confusion 
seems to stem from a shift in level of analysis—from meta-analyses to individual case 




studies. Framing as a research theory is also conflated with framing as a methodology. It 
seems clear from the multiple models proposed that it is a concept that is still being 
defined. According to Entman (1993), to “frame” is to: 
Select some aspects of a perceived reality and make [it] more salient 
in a communicating test, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation for the item described. (p. 52) 
 
As a general definition upon which to expand, a frame includes structures, 
processes, intentions, and goals that contribute to the construction of a frame. 
Framing research attempts to make those elements and mechanisms transparent 
by examining: how frames are sponsored by political a tors (Andsager, 2000; 
Coleman, Hartley & Kennamer, 2006; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 
1986); how media processes construct and constrain media frames (Cook, 1983; 
Iyengar, 1991; Mintz & Redd, 2004; Molotch & Lester, 1975); and how publics 
are affected by a frame in their interpretation anddecision-making (Entman, 
1993; Gamson, 1992; Price, Tewksbury & Powers, 1997; Scheufele, 2004; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
 D’Angelo (2002) suggests that there are some general assumptions about framing 
that most media scholars accept: (a) that media frames amalgamate text and image with a 
framing device of contextualization that is either episodic or thematic (Iyengar, 1991); or 
(b) that a mass media frame involves conflict, human interest, or consequences. Framing 
is a term used to describe the processes of meaning-making by media and other social 
and political organizations through the selection, omission, and construction of 




communicating messages for the purpose of influencing an individual’s perception of an 
event or issue. Whether a particular frame is consci u ly constructed for rhetorical 
purposes, or emerges unconsciously as a reflection of cultural values, framing operates in 
complex ways. Framing research seeks to make the structure and processes of frame 
construction transparent, because much of the power f a frame is in its ability to escape 
detection by the public it influences. A useful way to think about framing is in the 
manner that D’Angelo (2002) outlines in his meta-anlysis of framing research. 
D’Angelo (2002) classified types of framing research into three paradigms that reflect 
specific researchers’ attitudes and beliefs toward how frames are constructed and how the 
effects are exhibited. These distinct research paradigms examine evidence in text and 
images in specific ways, which he names the constructionist, the critical, and the 
cognitive framing paradigms (D’Angelo, 2002, pp. 876-878). Scholars agree on four 
basic goals for framing research, but may disagree on how and why a frame is generated 
and what constitutes measurable effects. The four primary goals are: (a) to identify 
thematic units called frames which are based on the content of the text or image being 
investigated; (b) to investigate the antecedent conditi s that produce frames which may 
exist as unquestioned cultural assumptions; (c) to examine the effects of news frames by 
analyzing how news frames interact with established schemata on an individual and 
social level; and (d) to examine how news frames shape public debate and social 
processes (D’Angelo, 2002, p. 873). 
  





 Gamson and Modigliani (1989) claim that journalists process information by 
creating “interpretive packages” that reflect the interests of different sources invested in 
the message. Further, they conceptualize process and tructure as distinct from content 
and its effects on publics. They place framing with a constructionist framework, which 
generates a frame’s interpretive package through “the use of metaphor, catchphrases, 
visual images, moral appeals and other symbolic devices that characterize the discourse” 
(Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 2). An interpretive package makes sense of events and 
gives meaning to them by indicating what is at stake. 
 Fundamental to the production of interpretive packages is whether the theme is 
deeply embedded within the culture as an organizing theme, how interest-bearers 
(Molotch & Lester, 1975) or sponsors (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) promote the 
interpretive package, and how media practices influe ce the dissemination through 
frequency of coverage, news values such as conflict, human interest and consequence 
reporting (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992). Gamson and Modigliani (1989) suggest that 
the most successful interpretive packages over time are those that can assimilate new 
events into schemata or constructs already operating within the culture—something that 
resonates within the cultural psyche of a nation and is then used as an organizing theme. 
Many organizing constructs are embedded in the American cultural discourse, some of 
which are modeled as two opposing sides of a dialect c such as the technological progress 
versus nature construct, or the personal freedom versus social dependence construct. This 




“shared public vocabulary” (Andsager, 2000, p. 578) enables a frame and occasionally a 
plurality of frames to compete for dominance on an issue (Coleman, Hartley, & 
Kennamer, 2006). In addition, part of the framing process involves ascribing causal 
consequences to the frame or the opposing frames (Snow et al., 1986). 
 Constructionist researchers believe that journalistic frames are of practical use to 
a public needing to form opinions and make decisions about issues of the day (D’Angelo, 
2002, p. 877). However, researchers using this interpretive model also assume that 
journalists limit the range of information due to a journalistic convention that privileges 
official sources, such as the government, as the most knowledgeable. The dominance of a 
frame in the media is therefore influenced by a stakeholder’s access to media (Carragee 
& Roefs, 2004), frequency of coverage, emotional valence of the message, and the 
absence of contextualization through additional stakeholders’ frames (Andsager, 2000; 
Coleman et al., 2006; Cook et al., 1983; Molotch & Lester, 1975). This study assumes a 
constructionist theoretical perspective influenced by news routines and processing so that 
the reality constructed by the media is weighted in favor of certain meaning constructions 
and not others. For example, framing has a boundary setting function. One instance 
related to the first Gulf War showed that spokesperons for U.S. policy were successful in 
limiting the choice of frame options to a retributive frame necessitating punishment 
despite antiwar protester’s attempts to expand the available frames to other forms of 
redress, namely reparation or negotiation (Lakoff, 1996; Pan & Kosicki, 2001). The 
defining or framing function serves to activate journalistic norms and conventions of 




interpretation that are both shared and recognizable by readers (Pan & Kosicki, 2001; 
Zelizer, 2004). It sets up a shared “discursive community by differentiating actors, 
actions and action settings to ‘act out’ its discurive and sociological binding” (Pan & 
Kosicki, 2001, p. 42). 
Critical Framing 
 The critical paradigm as defined by D’Angelo (2002) also has some theoretical 
insight when considering news frame creation. Carragee and Roefs (2004) examine what 
components of a frame influence public attitudes. It is their contention that it is not only 
frame content, but also in whose interests content is constructed that bears examination. 
Stakeholder processes that get reported in the media t nd to be dominated by those 
entities with the most access to the media. This process is separate from the construction 
of the frame, yet greatly influences what is reported. In general, stakeholders—whether 
from political elites or grass-roots social movements (Snow et al., 1980)—attempt to 
claim an ideological perspective through a process of deflecting resistance to a frame. 
The process includes strategies to incorporate or weaken alternate perspectives, and a 
constant delimiting, defending, and modification of, a rame (Carragee & Roefs, 2004). 
 Likewise, scholars who work within the critical and constructionist paradigms 
“claim that frames are the outcome of newsgathering routines by which journalists 
convey information about issues and events from the perspective of values held by 
politician and economic elites” (D’Angelo, 2002, p. 876). Framing practices that omit 
other information in order to support a narrow description of what is at issue bypass 




alternative frames and possibly alternative stakeholders (Coleman et al., 2006). A frame 
constructs a particular meaning and specific way of analyzing possible entailments while 
ignoring others. It seeks to gain adherents through ali ning certain values and beliefs 
within a particular frame’s definition. Very often these values and beliefs represent the 
most powerful stakeholders because they are the ones that have survived and succeeded 
in developing a shared public vocabulary. In studying the framing process as a result of a 
“meaning war” (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 222) between stakeholders, researchers can 
trace and make transparent the “relationship between n ws and the distribution of power 
in American society” (p. 222). Carragee and Roefs (2004) insist that studies on framing 
have neglected political power as a sponsoring source for frames, leading to an absence 
of transparency regarding the influence of powerful sources. Thus, contrary to other 
framing paradigms, the authors do not believe that frames can be simply explored as a 
“content feature” (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 225) that produce media effects, but must 
also question in whose interests those effects are to b produced.  
War and the Media  
 Culler (1997) suggests that meaning is created through a wide variety of 
discursive practices within a culture (p. 5), practices that include textual and symbolic 
language, historical assumptions and practices, and discourse through which meaning is 
continually negotiated. In this study therefore, with the topic of war, images are part of a 
series of cultural discursive practices that extend beyond a simple definition of war as a 
state of armed conflict between different nations or tates, but include social and cultural 




practices, war mythologies, and conceptual assumptions about war that have persisted 
over time and define the boundaries of war as a narrative (Culler, 1997). Particularly in 
media depictions of war, where photographs are primarily used to illustrate text, and 
occasionally provide the story themselves, a study of visual imagery, usually thought to 
document and provide information about war might eco a representational social 
discourse about war rather than photojournalistic ev dence of the particular war itself 
(Culler, 1997; Zelizer, 2004).  
Because the nature of photography is to frame and frames exclude, the manifest 
content of a photograph, and its reproduction and proliferation, becomes important 
evidence of how this discourse is shaped (Griffin & Lee, 1995; Sontag, 2002; Tankard, 
2001). Frames can be manifest in visual documents such as films, political posters, 
recruiting materials, and photographic representations of war. The study of war imagery 
can reveal how the media pictures war and can also reveal gaps in manifest content that 
historically were part of the war discourse and may h ve disappeared, thus making visual 
studies of war an important component to the study of how war is represented overall, 
and how war coverage changes over time (Reese & Lewis, 2009). 
 The scholarly literature studying war and how the media have contributed to a 
war discourse consists of two types of investigation: (a) commentary and criticism with 
deep assumptions of institutional mechanisms and processes from both a political and 
media perspective; and (b) empirical research studying how recent wars are framed both 
textually and visually in comparison to past wars and conflicts. As exemplified by studies 




on the Gulf War by Hallin and Gitlin (1993) and the Iraq War by King and Lester (2005), 
and Fahmy and Johnson (2005), studies are performed on a limited period of time or 
important isolated events of a war (Fahmy & Kim, 2008). Few, if any, studies bridge the 
textual/visual divide, offering an analysis that covers both image and text over an 
extended period of time. 
 Many of the empirical studies compare media coverage of current wars to those of 
previous wars, noting changes in information technology as well as media production 
values and processes that influence, in the case of imagery, what is made visible to the 
public. Factors affecting production values could include decisions regarding the amount 
of time and money to dedicate to a certain issue and the prominence it holds for the 
public. Within this literature, media scholars examine how media coverage of war is 
framed and through what processes that framing is accomplished (Gowing, 2003; Thussu, 
2003; Weber, 2003). My study aligns itself within the tradition of war studies focusing on 
a comparison of pictorial coverage during the Gulf War to subsequent changes in 
coverage during the war in Iraq and how the imagery h lped to frame the Iraq War in 
2003.  
War Imagery  
 War imagery is intimately connected to war photographers. As Tim Page, a war 
photographer, says in an interview, “Every good warpicture becomes an anti-war picture.  
You are not making anti-war statements, but the fact that you have made a good war 
picture means that it becomes an anti-war statement” (Tee, 2011). War photography, like 
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all great news photography, captures a moment in time that is symbolic, surprising, 
memorable, dramatic, and aesthetically appealing (Nöth, 2011; Zelizer, 2004).
 
 
Figure 1. Samuel Aranda (photographer),
The New York Times, World Press Photo 
12, pp. 6-7.   
The above prize-winning photographs exhibit many of the qualities of great news 
photography. The photograph on the left by photojournalist Samuel Aranda pictures 
Fatima al-Qaws cradling her son, Zayed, in Yemen after he succumbed to tear gas durin
a protest against the Saleh government. The posture i  
representations of the pieta
to dramatically illustrate the universality of a grieving mother whether Christian o
Muslim. Through this conjunction it becomes 
photograph on the right, was 
Kozyrev. The juxtaposition of the little boy looking at the image of an American Barbie 
painted on a wardrobe door 










reminiscent of Christian 
. The use of the posture emphasizes a symbolic 
a great photograph (Figure 1). The 
a 2003 World Press Photo winner by photographer, 
symbolizes the military and cultural invasion taking place at 
. At first glance the photo is charming, while expressing a 
Figure 2. Yuri Kozyrev 
(photographer), in Time












memorable and cynical perspective of the war. However, inclusion of war images into 
news coverage is not only about memorable and prize-w nning photographs. Particularly 
in newsmagazines that now include access to online compendiums of photographs 
attached to an article, coverage is aggregated, with a series of photographs grouped to 
complete a story, or offer aspects of a particular event, such as a battle, or multiple details 
concerning an issue such as the legal and moral arguments surrounding the use of torture.  
 The reason that images can be the subject matter of social science is that they can 
reveal basic underlying, and very often unconscious, as umptions or paradigms from 
which we operate (Wagner, 2011). Those assumptions will leak out into our symbolic 
forms, such as photography, to create meaning (Thomps n, 1990). The power and robust 
nature of photography to appeal to the emotions is the result of parallel features of 
photography as both a denotative and connotative vehicle of meaning. Within journalism, 
its denotative function seems to take precedence with its ability to depict the world 
“realistically” and the requisite association to truth-values, representation, and 
indexicality. However, it is impossible to disentangle connotative functions from 
denotative functions of photography, as photographs simultaneously tap into symbolic 
language associated with universality and generalizability (Hall, 1974; Sekula, 1984 in 
Zelizer, 2004, p. 117).  
 Media use of imagery increases significantly during wartime, and, after 
September 11, 2001, sometimes doubled in newspapers nd newsmagazines. This trend 
continued with the Gulf War in 1991, the war in Afghanistan in 2002, and the Iraq War in 




2003 (Zelizer, 2004). This trend toward the visual is enhanced by online repositories of 
images to expand what is available in the printed vrsions of newspapers and 
newsmagazines. However, this does not necessarily indicate that more topical 
information about a war is being made available to publics, because many of the 
photographs represent familiar tropes without specific information that would 
contextualize the photographs to thematic reference points of the war (Zelizer, 2004, p. 
121). 
Access and Censorship 
 The military has required and the media has complied with censorship protocols 
regarding publication of photographs of American dead during most wars in which the 
U.S. has been involved. The U.S. had been at war for 21 months in WWII before images 
of dead soldiers appeared in print. The strict censorship of WWI was relaxed during 
WWII and photographers were allowed onto the battlefield. They could photograph what, 
when, and how they wanted. However, those photographs were censored both in the field 
and again in Washington before release. At the beginning of the war, the delays in 
publication could be as long as 4 months, but after th  invasion of Normandy, the Allies 
were winning and publication was swift despite military censorship (Kobré, 2008, p. 
447). Photographs of dead or mutilated soldiers were placed in a secret Pentagon file 
called the “Chamber of Horrors” (Kobré, 2008, p. 446). Censors were worried that if 
Americans saw pictures of the dead, that they would press for compromise settlements 
with Germany and Japan. However, later in the war, hen the government felt that the 




American public had become too complacent due to all the reporting of Allied victories, 
they did release some of these photographs. 
 There were opposing viewpoints to censorship—that withholding photographs 
was treating the public like children, or the view that too much photography of war was 
unhealthy for the viewer. Interestingly, “the censors held back any pictures showing 
racial conflicts at American bases, and other visual evidence of disunity or disorder” 
(Kobré, 2008, p. 446). Following the surrender of Hitler, photographers were present 
with the troops at the opening of concentration camps throughout Europe. Many 
members of the public did not believe the written rports of the scenes of mass graves 
and emaciated corpses encountered in the camps. Once the photographs were published 
however, the public was shocked at the extent of the annihilation of targeted groups such 
as Jews, homosexuals, and gypsies (Kobré, 2008, p. 447). 
 During the Korean War, General MacArthur allowed photographers to self-
censor, until American forces began to retreat. At tha point he imposed full and absolute 
military censorship. However, even before full censorship, only 5% of the self-censored 
photographs included combat photos. This percentage is far lower that the 22% combat 
photos that were published during the war in Vietnam, nd the 24% that showed brief 
glimpses of American dead and wounded (Hallin, 1986, p. 129). A more developed 
system of accreditation of journalists combined with no military censorship was a new 
development during Vietnam. Correspondents and photojournalists were given the 
freedom to report, photograph, and transmit anything they wanted aside from sensitive 




strategic military operations, troop movements, and bo y counts. The press exercised 
self-censorship more often than the military enforced it by withdrawing accreditation. A 
more subtle form of censorship was exercised through the dependence of reporters for 
transportation by military helicopters through the jungle (Moeller, 1989, p. 361). 
Although photographs of the dead and wounded on both sides were taken, relatively little 
reached the American public despite lack of military censorship at the time. Exceptions 
did occur as in a critical and shocking report by Morley Safer in 1965 that filmed the 
destruction of the Vietnamese village Cam Ne by American marines. But this was by no 
means the rule. To the consternation of reporters and photojournalists, a substantial 
amount of “news management” (Moeller, 1989, p. 363) was attempted by the government 
and practiced by media organizations alike. 
 It has been claimed that the relative freedom of ph tojournalists during the 
Vietnam War and the subsequent negative response by American audiences to graphic 
images of war was responsible for the American pullout from Vietnam. Media scholars 
deny that claim (Griffin, 1995, 2004, 2010; Hallin, 1986), and suggest that visual images 
may have an impact of their own, but it is more likly that publics were explicitly told 
what they were seeing (Hallin, 1986; Sontag, 1973, 2003). Although many other wars 
have occurred during the Cold War era (1945-1991), and post Cold War (1991-2001) era, 
the First Gulf War and subsequent post 9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq garner the 
most interest from mass media scholars.  
 




The Gulf War  
 During the Gulf War (August 1990–February 1991) media coverage of the 
conflict was heavily censored by the military. Most coverage was reported based on 
briefings organized by the military. A small group of journalists was allowed access to 
individual soldiers, but only if they were accompanied by an officer and subject to prior 
approval and subsequent editing. General coverage ws accomplished through the pool 
system, with a small number of journalists allowed into Iraq, sharing photographs and 
reports while the majority of journalists were stationed in Saudi Arabia. This level of 
censorship was a significant change from coverage during the Vietnam War when U.S. 
military censorship was practically nonexistent (Moeller, 1989, p. 363). Despite this 
censorship, coverage during the commencement of coalition hostilities recurred in a 
twenty-four hour per day, seven days a week news cycle of the Cable News Network 
(CNN). CNN broadcast uninterrupted visuals related to the war repeating the same 
images over and over again, and later referred to as “techno-imagery” (Griffin & Lee, 
1995, p. 83). 
 The Gulf War differentiates itself in another way from previous wars in that it was 
the first war following the Vietnam War to have been fought with a professional U.S. 
military as opposed to one comprised of both professional soldiers and draftees, as were 
WWI, WWII, Korea, and Vietnam wars. The death count of coalition troops during the 
Gulf War in 1991 was relatively low compared to other wars, including the later Iraq War 
of 2003. The low body count was most probably due to the short period of conflict in 




which the coalition troops were involved in the Gulf War (January 17, 1991– February 
28, 1991). Civilian deaths are notably higher than military deaths in all wars. The Project 
on Defense Alternatives estimates that the ratio of Iraqi combatant and noncombatant 
deaths during the first three months of the Gulf War compared to the first three months of 
the Iraq War were almost indistinguishable despite being fought with completely 
different goals in mind. The proximate goal of the Gulf War was to expel the invading 
Iraqi military from Kuwait, and that of the Iraq War was to effect regime change 
(Conetta, 2003). U.S. Department of Defense statistics for total U.S. military deaths 
attributed to the Iraq War is 4,409, with 31,924 wounded as of May 4, 2012 (U.S. Dept. 
of Defense, 2012). The U.S. Department of Defense does not provide casualty figures for 
Iraqi combatants or noncombatants. Tentative figures of violent deaths of noncombatants 
compiled from verifiable death records by a nonprofit U.K./U.S. organization is 
estimated to be about 116,000 as of January 2012. These figures are significantly lower 
than previous wars such as World War II (CBS, 2005) and Vietnam (Hirschman, Preston, 
& Loi, 1995) that had civilian fatalities in the millions. 
 Particularly with military wounded, the survival rte increases as medical 
technologies enable medical personnel to save lives that earlier would have certainly been 
added to the lists of the deceased. This leads to military personnel with enduring traumas 
such as amputations or traumatic brain injuries. Still, the statistics for the U.S. military 
wounded in action does not approach the statistics from the previous wars, with U.S. 




wounded in Vietnam reaching above 153,000 compared to the 32,000 of the Iraq War 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2012).  
 Griffin and Lee (1995) questioned whether the perception of the Gulf War as a 
war witnessed first-hand was indeed reflected in the images used to represent th  war. 
They were spurred by earlier studies of the Vietnam War that belied popular perceptions 
of the Vietnam War as a “living room war,” during which combat was covered in the 
field, documenting the human cost of war. Those studies, including the later 
comprehensive study by Hallin (1986) showed that con rary to popular opinion, the 
coverage was remarkably restrained given the lack of ensorship (p. 131). The same 
question motivated Griffin and Lee to ask a similar question about the Gulf War, namely, 
whether what was popularly considered to be a war that the public witnessed first-hand 
on television, was reflected in the images the public saw. Their content analysis of three 
news magazines revealed that contrary to popular opinion and claims by CNN that the 
coverage was “live,” only the initial days of the war provided “live” coverage after which 
coverage “reproduced traditional patterns of war imagery much like those . . . in high 
school history textbooks” (Griffin & Lee, 1995, p. 821). Griffin and Lee (1995) quote 
Perlmutter’s visual study of high school textbooks in which photographs are described as 
predominantly U.S. centered and focused on action. Perlmutter also found that the action 
shots were either staged or inauthentic and that editors avoided images depicting death, 
injury, or implied death such as funerals (Griffin & Lee, 1995; Perlmutter, 1992).  




 One of the concerns expressed by Griffin and Lee (1995) was whether the public 
was seeing images taken in the field. Were the published photographs depictions of actual 
events as they were happening, or did they tend to be symbolic representations of nations, 
cultural attitudes, and military power? If the photos depicted on-the-scene events of 
specific places and events occurring in the Gulf, then Griffin and Lee (1995) believed 
that the media were doing their job. However, if the images were symbolic 
representations of war, then media were not providing timely information, and coverage 
could not be thought of as a reliable record of the war. Symbolic representations are 
typically thought to support enduring symbolic concepts—in this case those related to the 
Middle East, Arab culture, military power, and the pr sidency (Griffin & Lee, 1995; Pan, 
Ostman, Moy, & Reynolds, 1994). Likewise, assessing the frequencies of on-site combat 
photographs could confirm complaints from journalists about “military censorship and 
limited access to war zones” (Griffin & Lee, 1995, p. 815) by comparing it to journalistic 
access and censorship during other wars. 
 Another concern of Griffin and Lee’s was to respond to complaints the media 
promoted the Gulf War. Therefore, in some of their categories they tried to capture how 
often Allied troops were depicted, and whether and in what ways Iraq’s forces were 
depicted. Finally, with the example of the Vietnam War, Griffin and Lee wanted to see if 
coverage would include evidence of the discourse surrounding a war such as images of 
civilian casualties, damage and destruction, and depictions of antiwar demonstrations 
(Griffin & Lee, 1995). 




 The content analysis results showed that 6 out of the inal 36 categories accounted 
for more than half of the 1,104 images coded. The largest image genre in each individual 
news magazine consisted of images of military hardwe, such as photographs or 
illustrations of planes, ships, tanks, missiles, and weapon guidance systems. These 
images were stand-alone photographs, illustrations, and schematics—some reproduced 
from arms catalogues or provided by the Department of Defense or arms manufacturers. 
They did not include images in which the armaments were part of the image content for a 
combat photograph, which were coded as the combat genre. For every photograph of 
direct combat (3% of the total), there were nine images of the American military arsenal. 
The original category included subdivisions that would include armaments from all 
Allied countries and the opposition. However, the coverage focused overwhelmingly on 
American armaments and military capability (Griffin & Lee, 1995). 
 The second most frequent category consisted of photographs of troops, and 
included American, Allied, and Iraqi troops in noncombat situations. Griffin and Lee 
(1995) made an assumption that the public would be seeing images from both American 
and Allied troops, because President George H.W. Bush’s response to Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait was based on U.N. resolutions and a multinatio l coalition of troops. The 
complete category comprised 14% of the total photographs coded. However, within that 
14%, U.S. troops were pictured 95% of the time, Allied (Saudi, Kuwait) soldiers and 
pilots comprised 2% of the total, and 3% pictured Iraqi soldiers. Two aspects of this 
coverage are noteworthy. First, that the second most frequent category is comprised of 




behind the scene photographs of troops, many taken before the war in preparation for 
combat and virtually replacing coverage of soldiers n combat, typical of previous war 
coverage. Second, reportage shows an overwhelming dominance of coverage of U.S. 
troops to the exclusion of Allied troops and with a total of five photographs of Iraqi 
troops. 
 The third most frequent category of coverage included Western political (7%) and 
military leaders (5%) comprising 12% of the total coverage. Again, the coverage was 
predominantly U.S. centered. Photographs of Iraqi political leaders (4%) were comprised 
almost exclusively of photographs of Saddam Hussein in an equal amount to photographs 
of George H.W. Bush. Photographs of Bush and Hussein w re often positioned opposite 
one another on one page or a double page spread facing each other as if the conflict was a 
personal confrontation between two leaders (Griffin & Lee, 1995; Hallin & Gitlin, 1993). 
Coverage of American political and military leaders was more varied, including 
congressional leaders and various military commanders. However, Saddam Hussein was 
the exclusive representative of Iraqi political and military leaders except for one picture 
of Tariq Aziz, Iraq’s Prime Minister. There were noIraqi military leaders pictured at all 
(Griffin & Lee, 1995, p. 118).  
 The categories “military armaments,” “unengaged troops,” and “political and 
military leaders” comprised 57% of the image genres in Time, Newsweek and US News 
and World Report. They were the top three image genres across news magazines and 
within each news magazine. According to Griffin and Lee (1995), this coverage 




emphasized U.S. firepower by cataloging the arsenal with an overwhelming 249 images 
compared to 40 images of Iraqi weaponry. This coverag  also focused predominantly on 
noncombat troops (158 images) with 38 pictures of U.S. troops in combat. In contrast, 
there are only five pictures of Iraqi soldiers, which leave them literally and 
metaphorically unseen. When the enemy is reduced to a stereotype, they are 
metaphorically unseen because the images “reinforce prevailing news narratives rather 
than contribute independent or unique visual information” (Griffin, 2005, p. 399). 
Photographs that present a more nuanced image of th “enemy” are available of course, 
but they are not used within the discourse about war. The predominance of images of 
U.S. political and military leaders, contrasted with a visually ill-defined enemy, or 
visually defined through one image of Saddam Hussein, s ts up a conceptual 
juxtaposition of a plural U.S. society fighting against a monolithic state with one single 
dictatorial enemy (Griffin & Lee, 1995, p. 818).  
 Griffin and Lee (1995) argue that the content analysis identified elements of the 
Gulf War that remained invisible and therefore did not become part of the discourse of 
war. Much of that information is revealed in the gaps between coverage of previous wars 
and coverage of the Gulf War. The most obvious gap is the replacement of images of 
combat with images related to U.S. armaments. Equally, the lack of portrayals of the 
human cost of war, whether it is casualties, deaths, or damage and destruction has the 
effect of distancing the viewer from the consequences of war. This is in no way unusual 
in the Western tradition of war iconography (Perlmutter, 1992). However, this distancing 




has political and cultural consequences, promoting an inaccurate and sanitized version of 
war’s reality. Scholars, journalists, and philosophers have commented about the 
implications of an inaccurate understanding of war and its consequences. Hallin and 
Gitlin (1993) point out that war typically has a “narrative logic full of suspense, 
crescendos, and collective emotion” (p. 422), which lends itself to myth making. The 
idealized and romantic mythologies associated with World War II gave way to a more 
ambiguous and controversial set of mythologies after th  war in Vietnam and those myths 
are reflected in movies made about those conflicts (Hallin & Gitlin, 1993). Ott, Aoki and 
Dickinson (2011) suggest that framing weapons as “mechanical innovations—as objects 
of scientific inquiry whose history can . . . be chronicled in a detached and disinterested 
way” (p. 219) distances the viewer from the consequences and purpose of a weapon. This 
corresponds with the types of images Griffin and Lee (1995) found catalogued in their 
content analysis: photographs, illustrations, and schematics, some reproduced from arms 
catalogues (p. 816). 
 Zelizer (2010) offers another way to view the preponderance of armaments in the 
news magazine as images that presume death, such as pictures of the bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6th and 9th, 1945, which only show a mushroom 
cloud, but no death. The public saw the first images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 
August 11th. At the time, the connection between the image of a mushroom cloud and the 
loss of human life was unclear to a public for whom this was a new experience. Death 
was presumed, but there was no previous reference point to serve as an example of the 




possible level of death and destruction. Therefore, during a period when the discourse 
about nuclear armaments was developing, ambiguous images of a mushroom cloud 
“disconnected the event from its impact” (Zelizer, 2010, p. 88). Likewise, images of 
technological warfare, and armaments such as electroni  targeting devices, imply death 
without having to show actual images or assign agency to the destruction. It is left to the 
imagination of the viewer to create a visual narrative. In this way, “images of presumed 
death . . . provide multiple levels of distancing from the depiction of death itself” 
(Zelizer, 2010, p. 77).  
The Iraq War 
 Data from a content analysis cannot definitively assign meaning to the numbers, 
but they can point out differences or gaps in coverag  over time, and thus the changing 
discourse and its possible implications. Griffin and Lee’s (1995) content analysis data 
empirically demonstrate what other visual communication scholars mean when they refer 
to the potential of images and the power of their rpetition or absence to shape a 
discourse of war.  
 According to several media scholars, one of the most prevalent factors defining 
U.S. media coverage of war in the post 9/11 period is the policy of embedding journalists 
with the military (Fahmy & Johnson, 2005; King & Lest r, 2005; Kuypers & Cooper, 
2005). Following complaints about access to combat zones during the Gulf War, the 
military developed a policy of embedding journalists with the troops. With the new 
policy of embedding during the Iraq War, the sheer scale of embedded journalists was 




unprecedented, with numbers above 600 at the onset f hostilities (Pfau, Haigh, Gettle, 
Donnelly, Scott, Warr, & Wittenberg, 2005).  
Embedding is defined by the military as “a media representative remaining with a 
unit on an extended basis” to “facilitate in-depth coverage of U.S. forces in combat and 
related operations” (Pfau et al., 2005, p. 74). According to empirical studies of media 
coverage of the Iraq War by Pfau et al. (2005) and Fahmy and Johnson (2005), the embed 
policy produced reporting that showed deep, rich coverage of individual combat units, 
but was limited in its ability to contextualize to the broader goals or effectiveness of the 
war. Journalists received the same training as the oldiers with whom they were being 
embedded, and then were embedded for long periods of time, sometimes up to 6 months, 
with a particular unit. The authors believe that the dependence on the military for food, 
shelter, and protection, as well as the inevitable identification with the military forces, 
tended to weight the reporting to a promilitary perspective (Pfau et al., 2005). Journalists 
also occasionally used the first-person in narratives about developments of combat units, 
placing themselves into the frame of the conflict, writing, “we took some casualties,” or 
“we won that battle” (Gardner, 2008, p. 113). Fahmy and Johnson (2005) interviewed 
journalists about the purported promilitary perspectiv . The journalists interviewed 
reported that they balanced their awareness of a possible promilitary perspective with a 
belief that the unprecedented access and detail afforded by embedding overrode any 
concerns that their coverage jeopardized their ability to submit “accurate, trustworthy, 
and fair” (Fahmy & Johnson, 2005, p. 311) stories. In fact, the journalists believed that 




non-embedded journalists could editorially offset any such subjectivity with a different 
“slice” (Fahmy & Johnson, 2005, p. 307) of the conflict, such as reports on refugees, 
civilians, or perceptions not favorable to the U.S. military. Although the policy of 
embedding did not exist during the Gulf War (Griffin, personal communication, July 15, 
2011), analysis offering different accounts of the war did not materialize in the visual 
material published of the Gulf War. Less than .5% of the total photographs pictured 
civilians in any context (Griffin & Lee, 1995).  
 Embedding provides access to troops and military commanders, without a formal 
censorship apparatus that would release photographs only after they had been viewed and 
approved by military censors. However, the embed policy itself functioned as a loose 
censorship apparatus restricting what could and could not be reported and punishing 
violations by withdrawing permission to embed. The embedding contract restricted 
photographing identifiable servicemen/women on all sides of the conflict that had been 
killed or wounded, and also restricted photographing la dscape and urban markers, that 
would identify zones of military preparation. From the military point of view, the embed 
policy safeguarded against “disinformation and distortion” (Public Affairs Guidance, 
document unclassified, SECDEF MSG, DTG 172200Z JAN 03) and tried to balance 
media access with operational security. From a journalistic standpoint, embedding was a 
reprieve from the pool system of the Gulf War, but provided challenges to traditional 
journalistic values for war reporting. In a conflict zone, journalists are typically required 
to be responsive to immediate events as they occur, yet emain safe, to contribute reliable 




and sound information while remaining open to gaps in truth-claims from varying 
sources, to be dispassionate about conflicts with more than one side and the strategies 
that motivate them while remaining passionate about the erosion of human dignity, and to 
be compassionate about human suffering (Allen & Zelizer, 2004). Not only does the 
military want to balance access and operational security, but journalists want to balance 
their ideal values with access and a minimum of censorship when covering war. When 
those interests do not align, a struggle to control what gets pictured ensues. The result of 
the struggle between the embed rules and control of the military message with traditional 
journalistic values to inform the public converge in the media product that reaches the 
public.  
If we talk about images as cultural artifacts and readable like a text, or subtext as 
Culler (2004) does, we can posit that images have discursive effects just as conventional 
texts do because images live in our memory in a way th t text does not (Newton, 2001; 
Sontag, 2002). Images have added symbolic value when they become iconic 
representations and are utilized to culturally defin  a war (Perlmutter, 1998). Therefore, 
not only can images be analyzed by their manifest con ent and pictorial genre, but also by 
the cumulative and priming effects of repeated exposure to the same type of image 
(Newton, 2001). Early evaluations of the Gulf War as “nintendo warfare” or “techno-
imagery” seem to be confirmed by Griffin and Lee’s (1995) study. However, the question 
remains whether the Gulf War discourse represents an accurate depiction of the war itself 
or simply a symbolic representation of U.S. military power. Cultural attitudes about 




photographs that equate them with knowledge, truth, and evidence (Neuman, Just, & 
Crigler, 1992; Sontag, 2002) still pervade the litera ure despite proof to the contrary, or 
whether photographs warrant the assumption of evidence granted them. When Saddam 
Hussein’s statue was toppled during the Iraq War, Griffin (2005) found that the 
photographs served as a priming motif for news narratives. The news magazines carried 
numerous shots of the toppling, which served as “viible symbols of Baathist collapse 
and American success” (Griffin, 2005, p. 398). Griffin (2005) argues that in the end it 
doesn’t matter that later evidence from Reuters and AFP revealed that these events had 
been staged because “the mythic story served by these photos in American news-
magazines and on American television, had already become the accepted symbol of 
‘liberation’ and ‘victory’” (p. 398). Major and Perlmutter (2005) argue that news 
organizations are expected to contextualize what is being reported and pictured. In this 
particular example, the media showed cropped, close up frames of the event. However, 
only wide-angled shots would have been able to inform the audience of what was actually 
taking place in Firdos Square. This example illustrates the ability of a photograph to be 
used both to symbolize and to provide evidence, while lacking the warrant to do either. 
 In the literature, few comprehensive empirical studies have been completed on 
visual materials of the Iraq war to date. Keith, Schwalbe, and Silcock (2010) suggest that 
a multimodal content analysis of visual material would involve methodological 
difficulties due to the variety of media platforms involved in bringing images to the 
public: television, film, print newspapers, magazines, and electronic media. Consumers 




read each mode of presentation in ways particular to the medium, requiring a complex 
cross-modality methodology. Thus, single mode media analyses provide the most 
effective way of accumulating data on the use of visual materials in media coverage. As 
such, a replication of an empirical content analysis of Gulf War imagery extended to the 
Iraq War makes a vital contribution to the overall analysis of war as a constructed 
discursive media practice and process.  
Hypotheses 
Griffin and Lee (1995) showed that the discourse surrounding war had changed 
markedly from previous wars. It might only indicate that modern warfare itself has 
changed—that war is now irrevocably tied to technology. It might reflect the effective 
public relations efforts of the Pentagon and The White House, or it might be a reflection 
of the level of censorship and the pool system of war coverage. Given the differences in 
external circumstances of the Gulf War and the IraqWar—access to troops, degree of 
censorship, and length of the wars—four hypotheses can be stated. First, the media have 
claimed to have unprecedented access to the theater of war through the policy of 
embedding journalists with the troops, which was not the case during the Gulf War. If 
media has had unprecedented access to the troops, then a conflict frame should include a 
higher frequency of combat photographs as part of the construction of the interpretive 
package (Entman, 1993) than the images utilized during the Gulf War. The photographic 
coverage should provide a more complex representatio  of war in general, and how this 
particular war was conducted. Therefore the first hypothesis states: 




  H1:   The inclusion of visual images in coverage of the Iraq War  
   will feature more photos of combat compared to the amount of  
   combat depicted during the Gulf War. 
 
Similarly, embedding journalists with the troops should provide proximity to 
civilian populations and therefore an opportunity to cover the effects of the war on 
civilian populations as stakeholders in the cessation of hostilities. For example, one might 
expect more images that address the human cost of war not only to combatants on all 
sides, but also civilian populations affected by the hostilities. The restoration of services 
disrupted by the war such as basic physical and organizational infrastructures needed for 
the peaceful operation of the society should be pictured as well as the cost of war on 
civilian populations. Therefore, the second research hypotheses is:  
 H2 The inclusion of visual images in coverage of the Iraq War will feature more 
  photos of Iraqi civilians than coverage during the Gulf War. 
 
 Likewise, embedding journalists with the troops should provide proximity to the 
effects of the war on the environment, whether it is an urban or a rural environment. Such 
damage and destruction could include damage to important cultural and social edifices as 
well as the destruction of necessary resources for the functioning of the society such as 
water and oil. Such a framing would strengthen the journalistic value of objectivity and 
frame the war in a way that included more stakeholders. Therefore the third hypothesis is: 
 H3 The inclusion of visual images in coverage of the Iraq War will feature 
  more photographic coverage of damage and destruction than coverage 
during the Gulf War. 
 




In contrast to the Gulf War study in which catalog-style armament images were 
used to frame the war, embedding with the troops should either provide images of the 
results of this increased tendency to use highly technological warfare, instead of the 
armaments themselves, or decrease the stand-alone armament imagery featured in the 
Gulf War study. Thus, the fourth hypothesis is: 
 H4 The visual images in coverage of the Iraq War willfeature less coverage 
  of armaments captured in the “cataloging the armaments” category than 
coverage during the Gulf War. 
 
The results of this study clarify what effect, if any, embedding journalists with theroops 
had on the subject matter of published war photography. The comparison with the results 
of Griffin and Lee’s study of the Gulf War clarifies the similarities and differences of war 
coverage between these two wars. 
  




Chapter 3: Method 
 
 This study replicates and extends a methodology utilized by Griffin and Lee 
(1995) in their visual content analysis of the Gulf War. Quantitative content analysis is 
the systematic account and summary of key categories within a particular message set 
(Neuendorf, 2002). In this study, the message set is war photography. The strength of 
quantitative content analysis lies in its ability to reduce, simplify, and explicate large 
amounts of complex media content. It can also track historical changes in modes of 
representation using frequency analysis (Bock, Isermann, & Knieper, 2011). Typically 
mass media content analyses do not provide details of individual images, but measure 
their general manifest content. More detailed visual content analyses point to specific 
aspects of a media representation, such as how women r cultural minorities are depicted 
through clothing or body positioning in communicating texts. Griffin and Lee (1995) 
used a content analysis to gather data regarding the inclusion or omission of manifest 
content associated with war generally and the Gulf War specifically. For instance instead 
of coding for how the president was pictured, behind a podium, a portrait, or at work, 
Griffin and Lee (1995) simply coded for the presence of a picture of the President 
regardless of his positioning in relation to other elements within the photograph. In this 
study, I replicated and ultimately extended their categorization style to analyze 
representations of the Iraq War.  
 
 





 Griffin and Lee’s (1995) categorization criteria were based upon a survey of war 
coverage from three previous wars: World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam 
War. They employed coding categories distilled using a constant comparative method to 
include manifest photographic content published during those wars (Griffin & Lee, 1995, 
pp. 814-15). Manifest content in a quantitative content analysis is considered content that 
is visible and quantifiable in the photograph (Neuendorf, 2002). For example, a 
photograph of a person within the context of the war such as George W. Bush or Saddam 
Hussein would be coded as present in a political category, while U.S. or Iraq generals 
would be coded in a military category based on Griffin and Lee’s categorization scheme.   
 Griffin and Lee (1995) defined their unit of measurement as a single photograph 
or image. Each visual document was supported with reference to the texts accompanying 
the image as headers or captions. Griffin and Lee (1995) found that an overwhelming 
majority of the images had a clear focus of content, so that coding for multiple genre 
categories in one image, and therefore weighting content, was not necessary (Griffin, 
personal communication, July 15, 2011). The content of the image was considered to be 
the overriding manifest theme or focal point of theimage. As one of the original scholars 
noted, “. . . we found that the overwhelming majority of pictures had a ‘clear main focus 
of content’ so that this procedure [coding for prominent manifest content] did not prove 
problematic” (Griffin, personal communication, July 15, 2011). Additionally, structural 
aspects of images such as color versus black and white photography and the size of the 




image were tracked for each image. Images were also coded for the degree to which they 
were contemporaneous with current events, as opposed t  those that were posed or 
staged. Posed photographs usually occurred with portraits of individuals such as the 
president or major political actors in the Gulf War. These photographs were relatively 
easy to spot by references to the source of the photo, such as the White House 
photographer in the case of political actors, or portrait photography taken by a 
professional photographer before a soldier deployed and used to represent soldiers who 
had died in combat. In the context of war, staged photographs were considered to be 
those that captured a sense of a battle through photographs of its reenactment. 
Historically these photos were accompanied by text indicating that the scene is staged for 
clarification purposes. There were also some photographs that were originally published 
and have since been revealed as “fakes” that were originally intended to deceive or give a 
false impression. One such example is the toppling of a statue of Saddam Hussein in 
Baghdad’s Firdos Square (Fahmy, 2007). The presence of an archival photo was usually 
indicated in the caption, was obviously taken during a previous war, or was the result of 
lack of access to the pictured individual, such as S ddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden 
and was therefore pulled from archival photographs or a screen shot from television. 
 A photograph or image was eligible for inclusion in this study if it accompanied 
any article covering the Iraq War from January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2011. 
These dates were selected to include images used to frame the necessity of the war before 
the war began, the onset of hostilities, and the proposed end of hostilities and pullout of 




troops in December 2011. There were no exclusions t this rule unless a photograph was 
duplicated in a cover or title page and then reproduce  again within the article itself. If 
there were duplications, preference was given to the photograph included in the article, 
which was usually the larger photograph. A protocol for counting the images when 
multiple images appeared on the same page was to number them in order from top left to 
right and from top to bottom of the page. If a photograph spanned the fold in the middle 
of two pages (which happened often), the page number assigned to that photograph was 
the left-hand page.   
 I based my coding categories on the original codes i ntified by Griffin and Lee 
(1995) in their content analysis of the Gulf War. Their findings during a pilot coding 
session found that some categories were not useful in detecting prominent content, or that 
very few pictures related to those categories. Therefore, in their final analysis they 
collapsed the number of categories, and combined a number of very low count categories 
into “other.” They did retain those low count categories that they thought might be 
measures of important absences in the pictorial coverage (Griffin, personal 
communication, July 15, 2011). I base my categories on Griffin and Lee’s (1995) original 
codes allowing the full spectrum of possible coding choices.  
 Weighting of content was only accounted for through the size of the image, with a 
cover or two-page spread counting more than a full-page image (or a front cover) 
counting more than a half page image, which counted more than a quarter page image, 
and so forth. In visual communication studies, it has been found that the larger the image 




size, the more salience is accorded to the visual content (Bock et al., 2011). Likewise, 
positioning an image on the front cover of the magazine accords that image relevant 
status as a defining image of the war. Coding for color or black and white images can 
inform us about the types of image shown in black and white, perhaps a particularly 
grisly or archival photograph. 
Coding Scheme, Codebook, and Coding Sheet 
 The coding scheme included five general categories under which multiple details 
were possible. The most general category was the genre category, which captured the 
focal interest of the photograph. Each possible genre had four options which allowed 
coding for four participating combatants of the Iraq War: the U.S., Allies of the U.S., 
Iraq, or Other, which might include images associated with non-Allied nations or the 
U.N. The general genre categories included: politica , military, civilian life, damage and 
destruction, and the emergent category of terrorism.  
  The genre categories were followed by detail categori s that included: people, 
types of warfare such as combat or behind the linesrepresentations, casualties, and types 
of damage and destruction. The category of people included political leaders, military 
leaders, soldiers/troops, POWs, civilians, protesters, and women and children. 
Armaments, which Griffin and Lee (1995) called “cataloging the arsenal” (p. 816), were 
divided into separate categories for each type of armament such as jets, helicopters, tanks 
or Humvees, naval vessels, missiles, and drones. One of the major findings of Griffin and 
Lee’s 1995 study was the prevalence “cataloging the ars nal” images which constituted 




23% of the total published. Each type of armament was originally listed separately and 
only later collapsed into one category called “cataloging the arsenal.” Following Griffin 
and Lee’s categorization, my original categorization design maintained their initial 
category distinctions in order to document the preval nce of certain types of weaponry. 
  Casualties were also coded to specify wounded or dead individuals who were 
political, military, or civilian in nature across the four sub-categories of war combatants. 
Included in this category were representations of death—pictures in which coffins or 
portraits of fallen soldiers or civilians represented he dead individual. The genre of 
damage and destruction had detail categories that included general damage to 
infrastructure—buildings, governmental agencies, housing, mosques, and roads. Other 
kinds of damage such as sabotage to oil fields or reserves and/or environmental damage 
such as contamination of water or the destruction of agriculture or animals were also 
coded for as subcategories of the general genre of damage and destruction. 
 The codes in the codebook accounted for demographic information about each 
photograph, which were identified by an identifying umber, the name of the publication 
in which it was published, the volume and issue number, the date of publication, the 
name of the photographer, the source of the photo (e.g.,from the government/military or 
news agency), whether the photo was black and white or color, the size of the image, and 
the heading, subhead, and caption accompanying the article and image. The above 
information is considered the “media context” in visual content analysis and was 




documented by the primary investigator on each indiv dual coding sheet before the 
coders came into contact with the images. 
 Each broad coding category, or genre, included smaller subcategories that gave 
more detail. A photograph was coded for its genre as well as the dominant detail category 
as the focal point of the photograph. If the photograph or image mode was archival, 
grisly, posed, or staged, that information was alsocoded. Most of the possible categories 
were not abstract concepts that required complex judgments by the coders. They simply 
required a judgment as to the presence of the category within the manifest content of the 
image. Most of the categories were nominally coded for the most prominent subject or 
content of the image, by which prominence was measur d by the centrality of the main 
subject matter within the image, or identification by a reference in the caption.  
 The coding form provided to the coders was a two-sided single sheet of 8-1/2” x 
11” paper with the possible codes for each image. Th  full codebook is included in 
Appendix A, and an example of the coding form after the emergent codes were included 
is shown in Appendix B. 
Data Collection and Sampling 
 I obtained images related to the Iraq War by accessing the physical copies of the 
three weekly news publications that were utilized by Griffin and Lee (1995). Time 
Magazine, Newsweek Magazine, and U.S. News and World Report supply weekly 
compilations of coverage of the Iraq War that “compress, recapitulate, elaborate upon and 
critique television and newspaper reports of the previous week” (Griffin & Lee, 1995, p. 




814). At the same time, these newsmagazines had large readerships and subscription 
bases as well as an online presence with additional visual material available through a 
website listed at the bottom of the page of an article. As of August 2010, the three top 
newsmagazines in the U.S. were Time Magazine with a circulation of 3,312,484; 
Newsweek Magazine with a circulation of 1,610,632; and U.S. News and World Report 
with a circulation of 1,129,618. All circulation figures are as reported by the Audit 
Bureau of Circulation (Huff Post Media, 2011). In addition to circulation numbers, 
newsmagazines offer the advantage of a “populations of images” (Griffin, 1995, p. 814) 
to analyze on a weekly basis establishing an historical paradigm of meaning for 
individual wars.   
 Portland State University library had physical copies of each periodical for the 
years in question except 2010 and 2011, which were available at the Multnomah County 
Library in Portland, Oregon. I documented each photograph that was included in an 
article about the Iraq War by making a list and numbering each photograph in the order 
dictated by the numbering protocol, noting the date of publication, and the page number 
on which the photograph appeared. Because each magazine is published at the end of 
each week and on the same day, the publication dates for all three news magazines 
coincided with each other. I decided to use a stratified sampling method because such a 
sampling “recognizes distinct subpopulations (strata) within a population” (Krippendorff, 
2004, p. 115). Each sampling unit belongs to only one stratum, such as the decreasing 
population of images per year of war coverage, so that sampling for each stratum can be 




conducted separately and can be sampled in their proportion to the census population of 
images (Krippendorff, 2004). Listing the census of images, which would later determine 
the stratified sample, was done in repetitive order of Time, then Newsweek, and then U.S. 
News and World Report so that the images in each of the three news magazines would 
reflect the same range of dates. The only time this order changed was in 2008 and 2009, 
when U.S. News and World Report reduced its frequency of publication to twice monthly. 
The subsequent bimonthly issues of U.S. News and World Report covered 2 weeks of 
news on Iraq. The original design to number the photographs with the date of publication 
was maintained through 2008 and 2009.  
 A stratified sampling method is also sensitive to changes in coverage due to major 
political and military events or shifts in policy. A sample that is sensitive to the war’s 
trajectory from 2003-2009, including major political and military events, is important to 
an analysis of war images due to a viewer’s ability to withdraw images from any 
contextual and representational anchoring (Anderson, 1989). Likewise, tracking not just 
the overall frequencies of manifest content, but also connecting image content 
frequencies to an historical timeline provided patterns of usage and omission not 
provided by simple overall frequencies. Included in the sample were images and 
photographs on the magazine covers as well as the smaller photographs in the content 
section of the newsmagazine, provided they were not duplicates of images reproduced in 
the article itself.  Further, the decision was made to physically go through each magazine 




after an online search using Communication and Mass Media Complete and the search 
criteria “Iraq” occasionally yielded articles on Iran. 
 The photographs and images related to the Iraq War from January 1, 2001 through 
December 31, 2009 generated a population of N = 4,754 images. In order to generate a 
sample size that would give me a 95% confidence levl that a random selection of images 
would reflect the content of the full population of images with only a 5% margin of error, 
I used Creative Research System’s online sample size calculator. With a census size of  
N = 4,754 as the population of images, the calculator generated a suggested sample size 
of n = 356 images. I then used the percentage of photographs per year to generate a 
random sample for each year of publication using Urbaniak and Pious’ (2008) Research 
Randomizer. Of those images, 1,950 photographs were published about the war in 2003, 
constituting 41% of the total population of images; 843 photographs were published in 
2004 constituting 17.7% of the total; 622 photographs were published in 2005 
constituting 13% of the total; 556 photographs were published in 2006 constituting 12% 
of the total; 557 were published in 2007 constituting 11.7% of the total; 144 photographs 
were published in 2008 constituting 3% of the total; and 78 photographs were published 
in 2009 constituting 1.6% of the total. These percentages indicated that I needed 146 
images from 2003, 63 images from 2004, 46 images from 2005, 42 images from 2006, 
another 42 images from 2007, 11 images from 2008, and 6 images from 2009. These 
amounts were then used to generate random samples in each year of publication using the 




sequential numbering system I had established when documenting the full population of 
images. 
 The numbers generated referred to the number of the photograph to be included in 
the sample as listed in the complete population of images. I then went to the Portland 
State University library and looked up each photograph according to the list, which 
included the publication name, date of publication, ssue number, and page number. 
Using both my iPhone and iPad, I photographed each image that the randomizer had 
selected in order to digitize the image for the coders to code. 
 My study includes both photographs and images, such as infographics and maps, 
from the preparation of troops before the onset of the war, including the dates January 1, 
2003 to the commencement of hostilities on March 20, 20 3, and continuing until 
December 21, 2009. The images published a few months before the Allied invasion of 
Iraq are considered crucial to how the war was visually framed. Additionally, my intent 
was to include coverage of the Iraq War until Decemb r 2011, when it was announced by 
President Barack Obama that U.S. troops were returning to the United States. A search 
for the missing information in 2010 and 2011 revealed that there were approximately 109 
additional photographs covering the war during thatime period. As a percentage of the 
full census, this would have included only an additional 8 images, 4 in each year. The 
Portland State University library had stopped carrying hard copies of the three 
newsmagazines and other regional university libraries only had the data on microfiche, 
which would only provide me with a negative photographic image. The one source that 




did carry the physical copies of the magazines, Multnomah County Library, had had the 
copies concerning the Iraq War stolen. Therefore, out of necessity, the break off date of 
the study was December 2009.   
Coder Training and Protocols 
 Two coders volunteered to code the randomly selected sample of n = 110 images.  
One coder was a former graduate from Portland State University’s Department of 
Communication with an M.S. in Communication Studies, and the other is an established 
artist and former graphic designer with T e Oregonian newspaper in Portland, Oregon. 
The coding protocol and codebook gave the coders specific parameters for the 
operationalization of each category (Appendix A), as well as an overview of the whole 
project. Thirty-five photographs not included in the codebook examples or in the final 
thesis sample were selected from the full census for an intercoder reliability pilot test.  
Intercoder reliability from the first pilot test gen rated 78% simple percent agreement 
across categories. With such a low percent of agreement, further coder training was 
necessary and I conducted a 4-hour training session with the coders. We reviewed the 
codebook parameters and systematically went through the previous coding attempt and 
discussed how the first test sample was coded, refining everyone’s understanding of the 
coding and category definitions, as well as adopting additional codes that clarified and 
distinguished one category from another. For instance, it became clear that it was difficult 
to know whether to code pictured veterans as military or civilian. A coding rule was 




agreed upon to create a category for veterans to alleviate this uncertainty and account for 
the amount of coverage veterans received in the media.  
 After the second training session, a further test of intercoder reliability was 
conducted by coding another sample randomly selected from the full population of 
images. The intercoder reliability on this second test sample generated a 94% simple 
percentage agreement and the decision was made to start the final coding of the sample 
photographs. Reliability coefficients of .90 or great r are acceptable to all, and .80 or 
greater are acceptable to report. Cohen’s Kappa, the method used to calculate the final 
intercoder reliability in this study, allows more liberal parameters (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 
143). During the pilot coding process, coders were instructed to place any manifest 
content that did not fit the established codes into an “emergent” category and to jot down 
suggestions for how they would code those photographs. The use of emergent categories 
to capture content not anticipated, particularly in a content analysis duplicating and 
extending the methodology of previous research, is a necessity. These emergent category 
codes were discussed during the second pilot training session and 11 emergent codes 
were agreed upon and added to a revised codebook and addendum to the coding sheet. 
The final intercoder reliability coding sample of 110 new images was subsequently coded 
using the additional emergent categories.   
 Griffin and Lee (1995) decided to combine some catgories during their coding 
process because maintaining separate categories did not reveal significant information. 
This process was also justifiable in the current cotent analysis. Thus, 24 categories were 




collapsed into 5 categories. The category “Cataloging the Arsenal” originally 
distinguished between different types of armaments for four participating combatants, the 
U.S., Allied troops, Iraq, and Other. This did not prove to be productive for the study, 
because the images associated with armaments included many different armaments 
within one, usually illustrated, infographic. An infographic was counted as one i stance 
of the category instead of counting each illustration of a weapon within the infographic as 
an instance. This compression of the category still allowed for subsequent individual 
images of weapons to be counted for each participatng combatant provided it was a 
stand-alone photograph or graphic image. Drones were maintained as a separate category 
due to the prominence they have received in the press related to ethical, policy, and 
budget considerations. This is justified by the increased use of drones as a war 
technology and particularly in as much as the 2013 defense budget proposed an increase 
in the budget for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or drones (McGreal, 2012).  
 The coders were given access to the full sample of images they were to code 
when I placed the randomly selected coding sample of 110 images into Dropbox, an 
online sharing platform for documents and images. The random sample of 110 images 
amounted to 30% of the full sample of n = 356 images coded for the study. A sample of 
20% would suffice to guarantee reliability and generalizability to a larger population, 
however, 30% seemed a more appropriate size for this s udy in order to capture 
photographs that included the large set of variables. 
 





 During the two coding pilot tests, 11 additional coding categories were agreed 
upon and added to both the codebook and the coding sheet. The emergent categories 
captured content that was either not present in the cov rage of previous wars, or were 
created to clarify existing categories. One category was created to differentiate between 
photographs of combat in which actual fighting was pictured, and combat patrol.  
Patrolling is a form of combat because of the diffuse nature of conflict in modern warfare 
tending more to smaller patrols, skirmishes, and sniping rather than battle lines and 
troops facing each other. The anxiety associated with constant vigilance necessary during 
a patrol justifies coding “patrolling” as a form of combat, but also its differentiation from 
battles in which direct combat is pictured. The new category, “C-patrol,” was included 
with four dimensions for U.S., Allies, Iraq, and Other combatants.   
 The original decision to omit “terrorism” as a category was made during the 
process of documenting the census data.  Issues of t rr rism were almost exclusively tied 
in coverage to the war in Afghanistan or to the events of September 11, 2001. However, 
terrorists and terrorism were tied to Iraq in a fewarticles justifying additional emergent 
codes. Consequently, “Terrorism–Iraq” and “Terrorism–Other” were added to the genre 
category and “Terrorist–Iraq” and “Terrorist–Other” were added as a subcategory of 
“people.” The categories “Terrorism–Other,” and “Terrorist–Other” typically depicted 
terrorists from other countries operating in Iraq and considered to be influencing the 
fighting. Categories to account for wounded and dead t rrorists were also created as 




“Terrorist–Wounded,” and “Terrorist–Dead.” Likewise, coding Iraqi civilians as 
terrorists because of their use of terrorist tactics like suicide bombings was decided 
against in favor of categorizing them as “Civilian Insurgents.” This category only 
appeared during the coding process after the beginnin  of sectarian violence between 
Shi’ite and Sunni Muslim factions. A differentiation between Shi’ite insurgents and 
Sunni insurgents was not made. In a similar vein, two additional codes, “Military 
Misconduct–U.S.” and “Military Misconduct–Iraq,” emerged when photographs 
associated with the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse, and the beheading of the American 
journalist, Nicholas Berg could not be accounted for with the original codes. The code 
“Political Misconduct–U.S.” emerged to account for photographs and images related to 
the outing of Valerie Plame as a CIA operative, andthe congressional hearings and grand 
jury testimony of highly placed U.S. political insiders. The subsequent indictment of 
Scooter Libby for his part in the disclosure of classified information and the connection 
to the suppression of evidence that there were no weapons of mass destruction as claimed 
by the administration was also included in the articles related to the war in Iraq.  
 When coders questioned whether to code U.S. veterans as military or civilian, the 
photos were examined and instances of either coding decision could be justified. The 
decision was made to clarify those decisions with the category of “Veteran–U.S.” under 
the larger military genre category. Similarly, categories of “political dead” and “political 
wounded” were added after a symbolic photo representing the assassination of an Iraqi 
politician was part of the sample and could not be meaningfully coded as military or 




civilian dead. The new codes were created to resemble the predetermined codes 
accounting for all four combatant categories involved in the war.  
Intercoder Reliability 
 Two coders and myself coded the sample of n = 110 photographs and images after 
which each code sheet, for all three coders, was entered into an SPSS spreadsheet with 
the number “1” indicating the presence of a category and the number “0” indicating the 
absence of the category. There were no missing values. Each individual category was 
entered into an Excel spreadsheet with the coders on the x-axis and each case on the y-
axis. These data were copied and pasted into the online reliability calculator, ReCal3, 
developed by Deen Freelon (2012). ReCal3 calculates Cohen’s Kappa, κ =  [(Ao - Pc) / (1- 
Pc] “where Ao is a proportion of units with matching categories (% agreement), and Pc is 
the agreement that can be expected when the two observer ’ proclivity to use their 
categories differently is assumed and taken for granted” (Krippendorff, 2008, p. 246). 
ReCal3 can calculate Cohen’s Kappa between three cod rs, establishing averaged 
intercoder reliability for each category as well as p irwise agreement between coders. To 
calculate overall agreement for all categories, I added the agreement for each code and 
averaged them for a final intercoder reliability of 86%. There were 64 categories that 
were not included in calculating Cohen’s Kappa because they were designated 
“undefined” by ReCal3. These categories reached 100% simple percent agreement 
because the categories were not represented in the coding sample and zeros indicating 
“absent” were recorded on the code sheets. Expected disagreement on such categories 




cannot be calculated according to Krippendorff (2008) and were therefore omitted from 
the intercoder reliability calculation.  
 The categories included in calculating intercoder reliability consisted of 61 
categories and yielded an intercoder reliability of 0.856, with maximum agreement 
reached in the “Military–Allied,” “Behind the lines–Allied” and “Destruction–Other” 
categories all with 1.0 agreement. The lowest percent agreement occurred in the category 
of “Political–Allied” probably due to coder uncertainty regarding the status of the U.N. as 
a neutral party versus an ally of the United States. Sy tematic divergent coding was 
evident in the category of “Grisly–U.S.” with an overall reliability coefficient of .66. The 
“grisly” category, as an abstract concept, was used to capture photographs in which 
soldiers or civilians were shown distressed, wounded, or near death. Any visible evidence 
of blood also implied a categorization as grisly. However, there were systematic 
differences between the coders regarding what constituted a grisly photograph, 
suggesting that the coders coded for latent content instead of manifest content. For 
example, a photograph of Iraqi women prisoners as shown in Figure 3 was coded by 
coder #2 and coder #3 as grisly, an obvious coding of latent content because the caption 
indicated that at least one of these women was scheduled to be executed. However, the 
















Figure 3. Yuri Kozyrev (photographer), in Time 168(21), 11.20.06, p. 45. 
Overall, pairwise intercoder reliability in the genr  category showed 0.78 agreement 
between coder #1 and coder #3; 0.82 agreement between coders #1 and #2; and 0.72 
agreement between coders #2 and #3. 
 The category of media context or mode of an image—whether it was pulled from 
an archive, was posed by the photographer or event organizer, or was an infographic 
explaining the political or military terrain—had a low level of intercoder agreement. The 
overall agreement for the “Mode” category was 0.67, with pairwise agreement between 
coder #1 and coder #3 at 0.60; between coder #1 and #2 at 0.71; and between coder #2 
and #3 at .72. Indications of archival images were usually aided by the caption; however, 
disagreements were usually due to omission, rather than disagreements about the mode. 
 The category of “People” as a detail category generated a total agreement of 0.87, 
with the highest percent agreement occurring in the cat gories “Political Leader–U.S.,” 
“Military Leader–U.S.,” “Soldiers/Troops–Allied,” and “Soldiers/Troops–Other,” 
“Veterans–U.S.,” “Protesters–Iraq,” and “Protesters–Other.” These seven categories 




generated 100% agreement. These all tended to be categories in which the caption 
identified the individuals within the photograph. Pairwise agreement for the overall 
category resulted in coder #1 and #3 reaching 0.86 agreement, coder #1 and #2 with .92 
agreement, and coder #2 and #3 with 0.82 agreement. The detail codes with the lowest 
percent agreement were “Civilians–U.S.,” and “Political leader–Other.” This could be 
due to failure to code for U.S. civilians if it was felt they were not the focus of the 
photograph, or in the case of other political leaders, simply not knowing the status of a 
pictured political leader.  
 The categories that had the highest percentage of agreement were “Cataloging the 
Arsenal–U.S.,” with an overall agreement of .95, and “Damage and Destruction–U.S.,” 
“Damage and Destruction–Iraq,” and “Damage and Destruction–Other” all with 100% 
agreement. The mode through which “Cataloging the Arsenal” was represented was 
almost exclusively in the style of infographics. Each infographic was considered one 
instance of the category despite having multiple images of armaments within the borders 






 Figure 4. Ed Gabel (illustrator), in Time 161(13), 3.31.03, p. 51. 




 The “casualty” category had high agreement in some detail categories and low 
agreement in others. High agreement was reached in “Political Dead–Iraq,” with 1.0 
agreement, “Military Dead–U.S.,” with .94 agreement, “Military Dead–Iraq” with 1.0 
agreement, and “Civilian wounded–Iraq” with .90 agreement. The lowest agreement was 
with the categories “Civilian Wounded–Other,” and “Coffins–Iraq,” both with an overall 
intercoder reliability of .333. For a full comparison and individual tabulations of overall 
and pairwise intercoder reliabilities see Table 3 in the Appendices. 
 The emergent category “Military Misconduct–U.S.” also had a high level of 
intercoder reliability with an overall coefficient of .94. Pairwise agreement between coder 
#1 and #3 was .91, between #1 and #2 was 1.0, and between #2 and #3 was .91. Many of 
these images were also included in the “Grisly–Iraq” category, which also generated high 
overall agreement of .94. 
 A post hoc review of the categorization scheme of Griffin and Lee’s (1995) Gulf 
War study in which I applied my coding scheme to the census of images used, revealed 
virtually identical coding with one exception, primarily in the “cataloging the 
armaments” category. The results of this parallel coding are discussed in the results 
section.  
  




Chapter 4: Results 
 According to the literature on visual methodologies, “there is no stable point that 
can provide an entrance into the meaning-making process; all meanings are lational not 
only within the image, but also in relation to other images and to broader dominant codes, 
referent systems and mythologies” (Rose, 2006, p. 91). The predominance of one code 
over another could be said to have “weight” in that its preponderance will act as a cue to 
cognitive relevance. In this sense categories with hig frequencies will become more 
relevant to the meaning-making functions of news images for a particular war. 
Statistics 
 The coded data were entered into Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), 
a software program that manages large sets of data and facilitates the emergence of 
patterns through text analytics and statistical anaysis. The coded visual content was 
calculated using simple statistical frequency counts and proportions to see if the 
hypotheses about changes in the visual categories in Iraq War images were supported by 
the data and differentiated from the data that predominated in Griffin and Lee’s (1995) 
study of the Gulf War. Typically the relationship between sets of numerical data and their 
significance cannot be determined simply by counting, therefore percentages and 
proportions of the sample were added to give more meaning to the numbers. A proportion 
“reflects the degree to which a particular category dominates the whole” (Riffe, Lacey, & 
Fico, 2005, p. 179). The results of the frequency counts have also been compared to those 
of the Gulf War to see if the changes, if any, are statistically significant in that the 




probability of getting the quantifiable categorizaton result reflects a pattern beyond 
chance, or are simply substantively significant, in that the real world effects the results 
have on the meaning of the findings are considered substantive. 
High Frequency Categories  
 Six categories captured 90% of the images. The largest category of photographs 
and images were of the “Soldiers/Troops–U.S.” and constituted 30% of the sample 
images with 108 images. This individual category was p rt of the larger inclusive military 
category, which captured another 10% of the images including military leaders, the U.S. 
arsenal, military misconduct, veterans, and military infographics for an overall genre 
category capturing 40% of the image share. Naturally one expects images of combat, 
troops, military leaders, and weaponry and technology to dominate war imagery. 
However, the prevalence of images of U.S. military troops to the exclusion of Allied 
troops, or any Allied involvement is reflected in the low or nonexistent percentages of 
photographs showing Allied troops or politicians. Particularly America’s closest ally, 
Britain, is noticeably absent in any representations, with only one photograph of Tony 
Blair in the political category, one of British troops on patrol, and the balance of Allied 
images consisting of the Peshmerga, a Kurdish allied militia. The second most frequent 
category was “Civilian Life–Iraq” with 55 images constituting 15% of the sample 
images. The third most frequent category was “Politica –U.S.” with 48 images 
constituting 13.4% of the sample images. The top three categories accounted for 68% of 
the sample images. The next two most frequent categories, the category “Political–Iraq” 




(10.7%), and “Military–Iraq” (7%) raise the overall percentage to 86% with a count of 38 
images and 24 images respectively. The sixth most frequent category, “Damage & 
Destruction–Iraq” accounted for 3.65% of the sample with 13 images.    
Table 1 
High Frequency Categories in Iraq War Pictures 
Category Subcategory Photos % of total  
Military–U.S. Soldiers/Troops 108 30% 
Troops  Behind-lines (25) 
  Combat (10) 
  C-patrol (35) 
  Wounded (13) 
  Dead (15) 
  General (10) 
Military–U.S.  Military leaders (5)   35 10% 
  Armaments (13) 
  Misconduct (14) 
  Veterans (2) 
  Infographics (1) 
Civilian Life–Iraq Civilians   55 15% 
  Women/Children (25) 
  Civilian Men (16) 
  Civilian wounded (7) 
  Civilian dead (7) 
Political–U.S.  Political leaders (33)   48 13% 
  Protesters (4) 
  Political dead (1) 
  Guantanamo (6) 
  Infographics (4) 
Political–Iraq Political leaders (19)   38 11% 
  Protesters (2) 
  Political misconduct (2) 
  Political civilians (10) 
  Infographics (5) 









High Frequency Categories in Iraq War Pictures 
Category Subcategory Photos % of total  
Military–Iraq Military leaders (1)   24   7%  
  Arsenal (2) 
  Troops (1) 
  Insurgents (11) 
  Military misconduct (3) 
Destruction–Iraq Infrastructure (12)   13   4%  
  Oil & Energy (1) 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Totals         321 90%1 
  
 Four hypotheses were proposed for this research. As a response to Griffin and 
Lee’s (1995) Gulf War study and the replacement of combat images with a predominance 
of images devoted to armaments (23%), it was hypothesized that journalists embedding 
with the troops would reverse this photographic trend. The first hypothesis, H1, predicted 
that the amount of images of troops in combat would increase compared to the amount 
pictured during the Gulf War. The second hypothesis, H2, hypothesized that more Iraqi 
civilians would be pictured in coverage of the Iraq War due to the urban nature of the war 
and access to civilians through the embed policy. The third hypothesis, H3, hypothesized 
that coverage would feature more images of overall damage and destruction than 
previous coverage during the Gulf War. And the fourth hypothesis, H4, hypothesized that 
coverage concentrating on “cataloging the armaments” would decrease as a result of 
having more immediate access to troops. 
                                                
1 Percentages have been rounded up to a full percentag  point if the decimal place was above .5, and 
rounded down to a full percentage point if the decimal place was below .5. 




    As hypothesized in H1, the incidence of combat photography increased during 
the Iraq War and accounted for 13% of the photographs in the sample. It is, however, 
important to distinguish between traditional combat photography in which combat action 
(3%) was pictured, and the category of C-patrol (10%), which was an emergent combat 
category. These images pictured troops within an urban environment and showed troops 
performing specific tactical tasks such as gathering information, reconnaissance, 
surveillance, and providing security. Such images do not impart the action, danger, and/or 
anguish that are typically considered to comprise combat photography. Patrolling 
nevertheless requires a type of vigilance consistent with combat and not required by 
troops behind the lines. Comparing traditional combat photography with the Gulf War 
study, which aggregated combat images for all natios, the percentage of combat images 
to the total remained at approximately 3%, with the qualitative difference being that the 
traditional combat photography in this Iraq War study only pictured U.S. troops and not 
allied or enemy troops. Also in the post hoc review of the Gulf War images, photographs 
that could have been coded as “C-patrol,” were not included in the population of 
photographs Griffin and Lee (1995) coded. This is likely due to the nature of the war 
itself, which was to expel Iraq’s military from Kuwait and not nation building which 
required a continued presence in Iraq. Chi Square clculated between categories related 
to images representing traditional U.S. combat, and patrol, as well as images related to 
the Iraq military categories in the Iraq War data with, n = 356, df = 1, showed no 




statistical significance, n.s. (Table 4). Therefore, th  first hypothesis was not supported 
by the data.   
    The second hypothesis, H2, proposed that more images of Iraqi civilians would 
be published during the Iraq War. Indeed, images of Iraqi civilians constituted 15% of the 
sample, a dramatic increase from the 1% pictured during the Gulf War and the second 
largest category of images included in the study. An Iraqi civilian was typically 
pictorially differentiated by dress, gender, and age. Categorization decisions were also 
assisted by captions identifying whether the person pictured was a civilian, a militiaman, 
or an insurgent. Chi Square calculated between categories related to images representing 
the Iraq military and images related to picturing civilians in the Iraq War data with, n = 
356, df = 1, showed statistical significance in onecategory — “Iraqi insurgents” and 
“Iraqi civilians” — with .041 p value (Table 4). This single statistically significant value 
however, does not support the second hypothesis. 
    The third hypothesis, H3, proposed that images of damage and destruction would  
increase in frequency compared to Griffin and Lee’s (1995) Gulf War study. This study 
showed an overall frequency of 5.62% of the sample picturing damage and destruction to 
all parties engaged in the war, compared to the 3% pictured during the Gulf War. 
However, the percentage of damage and destruction to Iraq alone was 3.65%, compared 
to the 3% in Griffin and Lee’s (1995, p. 817) study. Most of the images of damage and 
destruction in this Iraq War study were long-distance shots of Baghdad as pictured in 
Figure 5, or close up shots as the result of a specific incident as shown in Figure 6. 












Figure 5. Yuri Kozyrev (photographer),  
in Time 161(15), 4.14.03, pp. 52-53.  
  
 There was damage and destruction in many photographs, but the focal point of the 
image was usually not the damage and destruction, rather other elements of the 
photograph and were therefore coded to other categories. The damage and destruction to 
Iraq alone accounted for 3.65% of the sample, with 13 photographs, and included one 
photo, that documented damage to the oil industry through oil smuggling. This may be an 
artifact of the sample, but the scarcity of oil-relat d images is curious given the essential 
nature of oil exports to Iraq’s economy. The other 1.8% of the photos in the damage and 
destruction categories pictured damage to U.S. materiel, and damage due to the bombing 
of the U.N. headquarters in August, 2003, categorized as “Destruction–Other.” Chi 
Square calculated between categories related to “U.S. Damage and Destruction”, “Other 
Damage and Destruction,” “Iraq Damage and Destruction,” and “Oil” in the Iraq War 
data with, n = 356, df = 1, showed no statistical significance, n.s. in any content 
categories (Table 4). Therefore, the third hypothesis was not supported by the data. 
Figure 6. Wathig Khusaie 
(photographer), Getty Images, in 
Newsweek 144(13), 9.27.04, pp. 32-33. 




 The total number of images in the sample slightly favored both Time (36.5%) and 
Newsweek (38.2%) with U.S. News and World Report (25.3%) accounting for 10%+ less 
of the images selected during the random sampling. U.S. News and World Report reduced 
publication frequency in 2008, which alone did not c ntribute to the overall smaller 
percentage of contribution. U.S. News and World Report covered 2 weeks of events 
within one issue, the consequence of which was reduced publication space available to 
illustrate events on the ground, and thus fewer photographs. Despite this reduction of 
contribution, the top three categories: “Military–U.S.,” “Civilian Life–Iraq,” and 
“Political–U.S.,” accounted for 68% of the images and were the top three categories 
across all three magazines.  
Dominant Categories 
 Within the most prevalent genre of “Military–U.S.,” the category “C-patrol–U.S.” 
generated the most photographs with 35 photos and 10% of the total sample, this 
combined with the category “Combat–U.S.” and 10 photos (3%) constituted 32% of the 
U.S. military genre, and 13% of the overall sample. Typical combat photographs are 



















Figure 7. Robert Nickelsberg     Figure 8. James Nachtwey   
(photographer), Getty Images, in Time    (photographer), VII, in Time  
162(25), 12.22.03, pp. 80-81     162(26), 12.29.03, pp.45-45. 
 
Photographs coded as “C-patrol” pictured U.S. troops patrolling the streets, guarding 









Figure 9. Photographer unknown,  
U.S. News and World Report 135(4),  
8.11.03, p. 18.  
 
 In the post hoc review of the photographs coded for the Gulf War study, the “C-
patrol – U.S.” category was not represented in the census of photographs coded by 
Griffin and Lee (1995). This result is likely due to the nature of the conflict and not a 
reflection of differing coding protocols. Patrolling and reconnaissance was simply 
Figure 10. Gary Knight 
(photographer), in Newsweek 
143(1), 1.5.04, pp. 34-35. 




integral to a strategy requiring a continued presence i  Iraq’s urban settings. Because of 
this, statistical significance cannot be calculated. However, substantive significance 
suggests that inclusion of this emergent category has meaning for the overall differences 
in category dominance during the Iraq War. 
 Images of U.S. troops behind the lines constituted 18% of the military genre with 
25 photos. Behind the lines images usually pictured troops training in Kuwait for combat 
in Iraq, training Iraqi militias to take over combat duties from coalition forces, practicing, 
and Peshmerga guards in Kurdistan, a northern region of Iraq. They also portrayed 
training at West Point for the next generation of U.S. officers. Some of the behind the 
lines images were visually indistinguishable from real combat photos and therefore, as 
Hallin (1986) and Sontag (1973, 2003) suggest, were d pendent on captions to tell the 
coders what they were seeing.  
 The “Troops–U.S.” category dominated the U.S. military genre with a larger 
percentage of inclusion than “Military Leaders–U.S.” There were only 5 images of 
military leaders included in the sample, a low frequ ncy category of 1.4%. Images of 
U.S. military leaders replaced images of political le ders in 2003 and were primarily of 
U.S. generals that had taken over control of the U.S. troops throughout the conflict. 
Images of their counterparts in the Iraqi Army were p actically nonexistent, with one 
image of Saddam Hussein posing with military leaders in February 2003, before the 
hostilities began. No further images of Iraqi military leaders were included in the sample, 




which might be due to issues of access, but more likely s due to the contested U.S. 
administration’s order to disband the Iraqi Army in 2003 (Kaplan, 2007).   
 The casualty category “Military Wounded–U.S.” garnered 13 images (4%) and 
“Military Dead–U.S.” with 15 images (4%), had a combined percentage of 8% of the 
total sample. While the images of the military wounded did occasionally show the results 
of their wounds, including bloody and mangled body parts, the military dead were 
exclusively represented by photographs taken before the soldiers were deployed to Iraq, 
and were largely posed portraits in uniform. Occasionally a memorial tableaux arranged 
in a parent’s or loved one’s home, or typical military symbolism of a helmet on the 
soldier’s rifle were used to represent dead troops. There were four pictures of flag-draped 
coffins included in the representations of dead U.S. troops, one of which received a 







 Figure 11. Todd Heisler (photographer), Rocky Mountain News in Time 166(21), 
 11.21.05, pp. 42-43. 
 
 The category “Cataloging the Arsenal” that predominated coverage in Griffin and 
Lee’s (1995) Gulf War study with 23% of the total coverage and 249 images, constituted 
only 4% of the overall total coverage in this sample with 13 images overall. Drones 




comprised half of those images and were stand-alone images or infographics of U.S. 
firepower. As in Griffin and Lee’s (1995) study, none of these images portrayed this 
technology in action, rather they were portrayed as another member of the coalition force 
with one a glossy portrait from the drone manufacturer (Figure 12) taken with the sky 
lighted in a manner reminiscent of religious paintings, showing streams of light emerging 
from the clouds, which in visual aesthetics theory is thought to impart more spiritual than 







 Figure 12. Northrup Grumman-Landor, in Newsweek 151(23), 6.9.08, pp. 24-25. 
 In the post hoc review of images included in the Gulf War study, I coded the Gulf 
War images according to my own coding guidelines. My coding generated fewer 
“cataloging the arsenal” images than Griffin and Lee’s (1995) coding of the same images. 
Despite differences in coding protocols, the conclusion that “cataloging the arsenal” was 
a dominant category still seems justified given that coding during the Iraq War showed 
fewer of the same qualitative type of images as thoe coded by Griffin and Lee.  




 The estimated mean of the Gulf War study categories based on those reported in 
Griffin and Lee’s (1995) study and adjusted for aggre ation of some categories, was 
approximately 25. The estimated mean for the Iraq War study, aggregating those 
categories that overlapped in the same manner as was reported in the Gulf War study, 
revealed a mean of 9. An F-test for the significance of the difference between the 
variances of the two independent samples revealed p = <.0001. A t-Test of the two 
different populations of images assuming unequal sample variances and a 95% C.I. has a 
SE=10.69. As the sample means get larger, the more confident we can be that these two 
populations of images reflect different populations f images, that there are genuine 
differences between the populations of images, and that the respective samples are 
representative of their particular parent populations. The null hypothesis can therefore 
probably be rejected.  
 Of note is that images of American firepower (13) outstripped the number of 
images of actual combat (10). Although the comparison does not approach the one to 
nine ratio of combat to arsenal images published during the Gulf War study, images of 
weaponry still slightly exceeded that of combat in coverage of the Iraq War. Due to 
differences in coding protocols, statistical significance cannot be calculated between the 
Gulf War and Iraq War studies. However, substantive increases in pictorial coverage of 
troops and civilians suggest, that given access to troops and civilians through embedding, 
journalists do not rely on representations of power to construct and frame the meaning of 
war.  




 One of the emergent categories, “Military Misconduct–U.S.” contained images 
related to the Abu Ghraib scandal of U.S. Army prisoner abuse in 2003, as well as the 
killing of 24 civilians by U.S. Marines in 2005, known as the Haditha Incident (McGirk, 
2006, p. 34). Of the fourteen (14) images related to both incidents, eight (8) of them were 
also categorized as “grisly.” One image connected to Abu Ghraib has become iconic and 
was included in all three publications, although the image in the sample came from U.S. 
News & World Report  (Figure 13). The images were taken by the perpetrators of the 
abuse and the quality of the images are less than adequ te, but show a detainee in Abu 
Ghraib attached to electrical wires that would deliver shocks during interrogation, or if he 









  Figure 13. Photographer unknown, AP in Washington Post,  











Most of the images documenting the Haditha killings showed the victims in shrouds  
 








Figure 14. Lucian Read (photographer), WPN in Newsweek 147(24), 6.12.06, pp. 22-23. 
 The second largest genre pictured, “Civilian Life–Iraq,” had a 15% share of the 
images published in the sample with 55 images. Of those images 25 were of women 
and/or children, comprising 45% of the overall genre. The largest components of the 
genre were the categories: “Women Civilians–Iraq,” “Civilian Wounded–Iraq,” and 
“Civilian Dead–Iraq.”  
 The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh largest genres were “Political–Iraq,” 
constituting 11% with 38 images, “Military–U.S. (leaders),” constituting 9% with 33 
images, “Military–Iraq,” constituting 7% with 24 images, and “Damage & Destruction–
Iraq” constituting 4% with 13 images. In the political category, the category “Political 
Leaders–Iraq” constituted 50% of the category. At the beginning of the war in 2003, 
Saddam Hussein dominated the political leader category until a provisional council was 
established shortly after the invasion in April 2003, and speculation over future leaders of 




a parliamentary system of democracy included images of other possible leaders. Of the 
19 images showing political leaders, 8 images were of Saddam Hussein, 2 of which 
showed him after his capture in December 2003. Contrary o coverage during the Gulf 
War and Griffin and Lee’s (1995) observation that images of Saddam Hussein were 
juxtaposed across from images of George H.W. Bush as if they were confronting each 
other (p. 818), coverage during the Iraq War had few such images. Images of Saddam 
Hussein were used to depict him as a target and not necessarily as a legitimate political 
leader. Particularly during the beginning of the war, Newsweek magazine used a graphic 
element in the upper left border of articles that headed the section “Target: Iraq.” 
 The top six categories constituted 90% of the coverag , with U.S. military and 
political categories amounting to 53% of the coverag  with a total of 191 images, and 
Iraqi civilian, political, military, and damage and destruction categories amounting to 
37% of the coverage with 130 images. The balance of the images belonged to low 
frequency categories with percentage values of 2.2% or less and amounting to 10% of the 
overall coverage as shown in Table 2. 
  





Low Frequency Categories in Iraq War Pictures 
Category Subcategory Photos % of total  
Political–Allied 
 





































































 Total  35  10.00 
 
Image Mode 
 Archival images. Archival images were defined as images used to illustrate 
something in the article, but not depicting action on the ground in Iraq. It could be from a 
previous war, or a photograph of training going on in the U.S., or a photograph of a 
person involved in the war that was not taken recently, but drawn from the sources 
archives for whatever reason. The main point is that the photo was not taken close to the 
time it was published. 
 Archival images comprised 6.7% of the total images under study. Many of these 
photographs were images of Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, and other political 




actors such as Muqtada al-Sadr, access to whom was not possible at the time. These 
images appeared over and over again anchoring one image as the representative image of 
these individuals. One image of Muqtada al-Sadr (Figure 15) shows him in a menacing 
posture and a black cloak, which to American audiences, with little experience of Islamic 
leaders or attire, might remind them of depictions f villains in film. The photograph is 





   
   
 Figure 15. Wathiq Khuzaie (photographer), Getty Images, in Newsweek 148(23),  
 12.4.06, p. 29. 
 
posture. The repeated use of this type of archival im ge develops an iconic and 
metonymic reference for this individual and Islam in general (Nöth, 2011) to create a 
stereotype.  
 Staged and posed images. There were not many photographs that seemed to be 
staged at first glance during the coding process. Most of the photographs that were staged 
were discovered to be staged through further inquiry by journalists or scholars. Two 
particular instances in the sample, the toppling of the Saddam statue in Firdos Square, 
and the rescue of Private Jessica Lynch are the examples in the study. In the case of the 




toppling of the Saddam statue, it would have been obvious to photographers that the tight 
framing of the photographs omitted the paucity of civilian participation and framed the 
image as a victory and punctuation for the end of the war (Fahmy, 2007). The image of 
Jessica Lynch being transported to a German hospital after her rescue from an Iraqi 
hospital was not a staged image, although the “story” of the Jessica Lynch rescue and the 
details surrounding her capture misled the public. There were only two staged 
photographs in the sample, one of which was the toppling of the Saddam statue, and the 
second was an image promoting new “sci-fi” battle gear. It is not clear whether the 
soldier photographed is indeed a soldier, or a model used to promote what is termed a 
“future warrior” (Newsweek, 141/8, E2). 
 A distinction was made between staged photographs, in which there was an 
intention to deceive on the part of the initiators and has been termed a “pseudo-event,” 
(Baudrillard, 2012; Boorstin, 1992) and posed photographs such as those of troops killed 
in action, or portraits of political and military leaders taken for the covers of magazines 
and considered to be legitimate albeit conventional use of posed images. Posed images 
were coded, and accounted for 10% of the total images with 36 photographs in the 
sample. Most of these images were portraits of U.S.political or military leaders, 
photographs of deceased U.S. troops taken before they were deployed, or pictures of U.S. 
family members of the deceased.   
 Grisly images. Grisly images were defined as a type of image that s ows 
human(s) in extremis: distressed, wounded, or dead soldiers or civilians, or even the 




presence of blood suggesting a grisly incident. Grisly images were captured in three main 
categories: “Military Misconduct–U.S.,” “Civilian Wounded–Iraq,” and “Civilian Dead–
Iraq.” As a percent of the total sample images, grisly images accounted for 9% of the 
total images evenly divided between the U.S. category and the Iraq categories with 
approximately 12 images each. Some of the grisly images were of U.S. wounded troops, 
but qualitatively they were not as grisly as those f the wounded and dead Iraqi civilians 
or of the Abu Ghraib prisoners of war and Haditha incident victims.  
 Infographics. Infographics including maps constituted a large percentage of the 
sample images. Total images in the information graphic mode had content detailing 
American firepower, maps of Iraq, traditional areas of Muslim religious denominations, 
battles, and political support for the war in America. There were a total of 36 infographic 
images, constituting 10% of the sample. Particularly in a war in which Western audiences 
are unfamiliar with the culture and terrain of the Middle East, this is not surprising and 
can be helpful to publics trying to make sense of the conflict. 
Weighting Images by Size 
 In the original study, Griffin and Lee (1995) counted the number of images falling 
into each category and then weighted the images according to size to see if the 
prominence of a category was also reflected by the size of the image. They argued, “a 
smaller number of pictures appearing in larger scale ould have greater prominence than 
a larger number of small pictures” (Griffin & Lee, 1995, p. 823). However, they found 
that weighting for picture size made no appreciable diff rence to the frequency ranks of 




each category. The same top 18 categories of picture weight constituted 90% of the total, 
with combat images being raised to 6% versus 3% of the total count because of a larger 
and more prominent photograph size.   
 Weighting due to picture size did not change the ranking order of the top three 
genres in this Iraq War study, yet the percentage share did shift downward without 
exception. Contrary to Griffin and Lee’s (1995) Gulf War study in which weighting due 
to picture size increased the combat category, the larg r genre, “Military–U.S.” dropped 
to 33.07% from the original 40%, “Civilian Life–Iraq” shifted to 10.6% of the sample, 
down from the original 15%, and the category “Political–U.S.” also dropped slightly 
from its original 13.4% to 8.13%. There could be many reasons for this, however, most 
likely is the length of the conflict and the tendency of the news magazines to publish 
smaller images toward the end of the conflict than at the beginning. Taking only the first 
3 months of the war into account and weighting the sample images for that time only, 
which would match the timeline of the Gulf War coverage, the genre “Military–U.S.” 
garnered 69% of the images in contrast to 40% spread over the 9 years studied. 
   
  




Chapter 5: Discussion 
  The Iraq War was visually framed with a succession of frames diverging slightly 
from Perlmutter’s (1992) contention that images used to represent war follow 
conventional visual tropes about war, with a tendency toward action and U.S.-centric 
images. While the visual representations of the Iraq War were primarily U.S.-centric, 
photographs of action were rare, with photographs of traditional combat replaced by the 
qualitatively disparate “combat patrol,” imagery. The emerging category “combat patrol” 
could only be coded as combat as a latent content distinction, but manifestly resembled a 
distinction made by Griffin and Lee (1995) of “unengaged troops” (p.819). On the whole, 
the majority of the photography representing the Iraq War in Time, Newsweek, and U.S. 
News & World Report, were mundane, or tropes at best. The imagery did not reflect 
written accounts of the war, whether journalistic or published personal accounts (Hoyt & 
Palattella, 2007). Given U.S. military embed protocls that allowed journalists access to 
troops and civilians, the scant quantity of traditional combat photography (10%) is 
surprising, suggesting that either the embed protocols did not allow access to the degree 
necessary to gather combat images, or combat photography was edited out at the level of 
the news organization. The military journalist, Colonel William Daley, reporting for the 
Military Review, suggests that embedding only allowed you to “[see] the war through a 
straw” (Hoyt & Palattella, 2007, p. 97). The lack of an exhaustive visual record of the 
Iraq War in Time, Newsweek and U.S. News and World Report, has been influenced not 
only by the embed policy acting as an indirect form of censorship, but also by editorial 




decisions and the tendency for the media to primarily use political and military entities as 
information sources. It was also influenced by journalistic standards that require a second 
source to verify reports. In the case of the Abu Ghraib scandal in 2003, journalists 
interviewed after they returned reported that they w re getting reports of abuse, but could 
not publish due to their inability to verify personal accounts of torture, or were skeptical 
of the reports due to what seemed like fantastical a counts of humiliation and abuse 
(Hoyt & Palattella, 2007, p. 67). The Abu Ghraib photographs, in part taken by U.S. 
Army specialist, Lynndie England, and the subsequent exposé in the New Yorker by 
Seymour Hersch in April 2004 were the first time thabuse was confirmed by a 
journalistic source (Hoyt & Palattella, 2007, p. 66).  
Framing tropes and cultural assumptions 
 The U.S.-centric visual coverage conforms to an observed tendency by the media 
to favor official sources for content thus reflecting the issues that those official sources 
want to emphasize (Shoemaker, 1996). Images such as the individual archival portraits of 
Iraqi politicians and military leaders as U.S. targets, or graphics of armaments intended to 
accomplish that goal epitomized the U.S.-centric coverage and constructed a 
conventional visual history of the “enemy.” Photographs of practicing troops, combat, 
prisoners of war, and maps of the territory involved in the conflict all establish the 
hurdles and barriers to the U.S. interest in a regim  change, while assuming that there 
were no other stakeholders that might have alternative plausible objectives.  




 The increase in the combat category can be attributed to the coding of “C-patrol–
U.S.” as a combat category, with its emphasis on reconnaissance, surveillance, and 
security operations, capturing the majority of the images, and can very probably be 
attributed to embedding journalists with the troops. The rarity of traditional combat 
photos in the study, however, is puzzling given the access to the troops, but is consistent 
with recent war coverage (Griffin, 2010).   
 The U.S. embedding policy also acted as a mild form f censorship. Journalists 
were not allowed to roam unaccompanied in Iraq or Baghdad to photograph anything 
they pleased, which limited access to civilians unless troops were somehow engaged with 
them. Only unembedded journalists who worked in Iraq outside the embed policy had the 
freedom to photograph unimpeded, and usually at great risk to themselves and without 
protection from U.S. or coalition troops. According to some unembedded photographers, 
any attempt to walk away, even briefly, from the assigned military unit to cover some 
action nearby could lead to that journalist losing his or her embed privileges (Abdul-
Ahad, Alford, Anderson, & Leistner, 2005). 
 While a majority of the visual images documented U.S. interests and policies, 
according to a PEW Research Center study (2007), just more than half of the textual 
coverage was negative (56%), focusing more skeptically on the ability of the new Iraqi 
government to attain stability in Iraq than negative assessments about U.S. policies or 
overall success in U.S. goals in Iraq (PEW, December 19, 2007). This negative textual 
wash would also influence how publics read the images. 




 Photographs that perpetuated and supported U.S. cultural beliefs and assumptions 
of U.S. goals were further supported by images of Iraqi civilians in the process of 
fulfilling U.S. political and military objectives and policies in Iraq. For instance there 
were many photographs of civilians voting—a representation of the sought for 
democratization of Iraq. Images of civilian casualties that appeared were usually 
attributed to the insurgents or not attributed to an agent at all. One 2003 Time photograph 
showed a wounded 4-year-old girl being helped by U.S. marines and identified as “a 
victim of crossfire” between locals and Saddam loyalists (Time, 141/14, 22-23). Another 
2004 U.S. News photograph of an injured woman was described as “collateral damage” 
of insurgent clashes with U.S. forces in Sadr City (U.S. News, 136/13, 32). Captions 
tended to skirt any attribution of involvement on the part of the U.S. and allied forces in 
the rising body count of opposing Iraqi forces or civilians. According to one journalist, 
the military would decide when it was in their best interests to give an attribution or body 
count of the opposing side and that did not happen very often (Hoyt & Palattella, 2007, p. 
71). One image in the sample showed future Iraqi soldiers being trained by American 
troops (U.S. News, 134/16, 20). Interestingly, the photograph pictured Iraqi troops sitting 
in the dirt and listening, while U.S. troops were standing and demonstrating how to 
restrain a captive. The caption reads, “Skull session: Instructing new Iraqi militiamen,” 
and a headline, “The Men in the Shadows” referring to U.S. Special Forces as a model 
for a new type of war. Another image shows an Iraqi and American soldier patrolling 
together, with the Iraqi soldier taking point (U.S. News, 145/1, 28). While these images 




represent the transition to an Iraqi based presence, U.S. forces are still pictured in a 
dominant position visually, usually standing while Iraqis are pictured sitting and looking 
up.  
 There were few pictures of individuals working, going to school, or in their 
homes. A pictorial essay of family life in the sample hotographed by Farah Nosh, an 
Iraqi/Canadian photojournalist, and published in Time magazine was an exception. The 
black and white images were taken of Nosh’s family embers and are in a subdued mood 
with one showing a young boy smiling as he “dance[ed] to the beat of Eastern and 
Western music” (Time, 167/21, 44-45). More than 50% of the photographs devoted to 
civilians were of women and/or children. Although this might suggest that civilian life 
was being represented, it is predominantly those asp ct  of civilian life that intersect with 
U.S. military goals that were pictured—goals such as the establishment of democratic 
practices or “roadblocks” to democracy in the form of insurgent fighting and their use of 
“terrorist” tactics. Images of civilian Iraqi men were routinely older men, prisoners of 
war, men in subjugating positions such as on their knees, or with their hands tied.  
 A Pew Research Center study on how the press covered events in Iraq in 2007, 
confirmed journalists’ opinions that the subject matter they felt was “under covered” in 
Iraq War coverage was ordinary Iraqi civilian life (PEW, December 19, 2007). The same 
study found that 46.7% of the textual reporting covered daily violence. This number was 
reflected to a slightly lower degree (43%) in the visual reporting. Images reflecting 
violence showed: the results of bombings, armed insurgents and militiamen, the killings 




of the Blackwater contractors, and injured or dead civilians. Other photographs with less 
violent themes (57%) showed grieving U.S. families, Iraqi refugees, veterans in the U.S., 
military and political leaders, and one “mixed” Muslim wedding between a Shi’ite and 
Sunni.  
  These visual tropes were echoed in headlines and c ptions that tried to usher in a 
conclusion to the war. Examples of such attempts in he sample included a 2003 
photograph of the toppling of the statue of Saddam with the headline “Tyranny Tumbles: 
Iraqis topple symbols of oppression as allied troops clash with Saddam holdouts,” and a 
caption that reads, “Iraqis bring down a statue of Saddam in Baghdad with U.S. help” 
(Time, 161/16, 5). The later realization that this was an action orchestrated by the C.I.A. 
did little to dampen the symbolic value of the image as visual punctuation to the war 
(Fahmy, 2007), giving a false sense of success with the symbolic value of the image 
outweighing its value as a document of reality.  
 The PEW Research Center’s Project for Excellence i Journalism in conjunction 
with the Poynter Institute surveyed the American public in 2005 about its confidence in 
the believability of U.S. print journalism. A shift took place in 2004 with only 50% of the 
readership rating their primary print news source as believable, down 9% points from 
2002 and 13% points from 1998—with no difference betwe n national and local news 
sources. There was also an increase in readership preferring pictures over words at 55% 
indicating that television was the preferred source of news with only 40% preferring 
written news or hearing about the news on the radio (PEW, March, 15, 2005).  





 Counter framing is defined as a frame that “opposes an earlier effective frame” 
(Chong & Druckman, 2011) in that it appears later in time than an earlier effective frame, 
creates a meaning in opposition to the previously accepted frame and also affects 
opinions about the previously accepted frame. In the context of this study, the visual 
counter-framing appears in two distinct respects. Fir t, counter-framing appears as a 
visual counterpoint to the textual headline or caption accompanying the photograph; and 
second, as a visual counter-frame to deeply held social and cultural beliefs and 
commitments. 
 Visual counter-framing of text 
 There were many instances in the sample of visual counter-framing of headlines. 
While the caption might have accurately described what was taking place in the 
photograph, the photograph’s representative task wa in opposition to the headline it was 
purported to represent. An early example in the study’s sample was a picture of Secretary 
of State Colin Powell addressing the U.N. to assert th  presence of weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq. There are many photographs of Secretary Powell holding a model vial 
of Anthrax, but the photograph chosen to accompany the article, was one in which he was 
pursing his lips as if inhaling cannabis (Time, 161/7, 26), perhaps a visual commentary 
on the likelihood of weapons of mass destruction the U.S. administration was using to 
justify the invasion of Iraq. 










 Figure 16. Mike Segar (photographer). Reuters in 
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 Figure 17. Damir Sagofj (photographer), Reuters in 
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Visual counter-framing of cultural commitments 
 One way to maintain a cultural commitment to the superiority of your armed 
forces is to shift responsibility for outcomes to a different responsible party. In the case of 
the Iraq War, the proximate goal of the war was regim  change. The new Iraqi parliament 
and newly trained armed forces were textually and visually framed as the new 
responsible party, while U.S. involvement was portrayed as ancillary and supportive of 
the new regime. A 2007 photograph by Guassem Zein is accompanied by text referring to 
Iraqi forces in the third person and the problems “they” are facing. The headline reads, 
“Apocalypse Now” (Newsweek, 149/7, 36-37), a reference to Francis Ford Coppola’s 
epic Vietnam film of the same name. Responsibility for the future of the war is editorially 
associated solely with Iraqi forces. Another shift of responsibility is suggested by the 
photograph of a U.S. army officer as an advisor to I aqi officers describing his job as 
“armed social work” (Time, 148/25, 43). The dissonance between the two concepts of 
social work and carrying a weapon suggests a cautious withdrawal and distancing from 
the former position of armed soldier to one of social work and a cessation of active 
warfare despite an increase in fatalities at the tim  of publication. Similarly, the headline 
“On duty at the Alamo,” is accompanied by a photograph of a lone bespectacled soldier 
patrolling along what appears to be a street of adult men watching him. The photograph 
bridges the magazine fold to take up one third of the double page spread and is a 
composite of two photographs visually joined at the fold. It is unknown if the two 
photographs were taken at two different time periods, r is a cropped panoramic photo 
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depicting actual events. The headline leaves no doubt that the defense of the area pictured 
is a doomed enterprise, just as the battle for the Alamo was doomed by 
forces (Newsweek, 148/18
one another, both the photograph and article counter
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 Figure 19. Yuri Kozyrev (photographer)
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 American discursive practices construct a war mythology weighted toward an 
assumption of the just war and our troops as fair and principled individuals led by trained 
and disciplined officers. Those cultural commitments are reinforced by film enactments 
of past wars, in which average servicemen and women ar  portrayed as unambiguous 
bearers of that mythology. Perhaps the most damaging photographs associated with the 
Iraq War were the Abu Ghraib photographs that counter-framed the American mythology 
with images of torture and abuse by American servicmen and –women. The Abu Ghraib 
photographs in U.S. News & World Report used a textual variation of  “shock and awe,” a 
reference to the U.S. military strategy for rapid dominance, by headlining the article with 
“Shocking and Awful” (U.S. News & World Report 136/17, 28-31). Another Newsweek 
article examining how torture came to define the U.S. military engagement in Iraq 
headlined the article with “The Roots of Torture” with a photograph of President George 
W. Bush and Alberto Gonzalez, White House Attorney General (Newsweek 143 /21, 29). 
This juxtaposition of the president and the headline suggested a causal relationship 
between torture and President Bush, thus counter-framing a cultural commitment toward 
America as the architect of democracy and fair play. 
 The publication of images of prisoner torture and buse by U.S. military 
personnel frames the Iraq War as a war coming apart t the seams and conducted in a 
way contrary to deeply held cultural beliefs about America’s fairness and honor. Not only 
public opinion in America was affected, but the photographs became evidence for 
American allies, Iraqi combatants, and Iraqi civilians alike that considered the 




photographs evidence of practices, about which they had only heard rumors (Hoyt & 
Palattella, 2007, p. 70). 
 According to a PEW study, the Abu Ghraib photographs influenced American 
attitudes about the war by lowering public satisfaction with the war’s trajectory to 46% 
from its stable 70% approval rating in January 2004 (PEW, May, 2004). However, on the 
heels of the Abu Ghraib scandal and the early 2004 killing and desecration of four U.S. 
Blackwater contractors, support for keeping troops in Iraq was still above average at 
53%, with evaluations of the Bush presidency dropping to 44% (PEW, May, 2004). The 
survey first primed the subjects by asking about Abu Ghraib images, which significantly 
lowered approval ratings of President Bush. When asked further for opinions about 
remaining in Iraq, the respondents favored remaining in Iraq until a stable democratic 
government could be established. Priming and framing effects in how the questions were 
asked by prefacing the question with questions about whether the respondents had seen 
images of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuses influenced th  responses, after which questions 
about staying to complete the mission reverted to other decision-making values (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007).  
 In contrast, the political misconduct by U.S. administration insiders that leaked 
classified information in retaliation for a report suggesting that they had knowledge 
before the war began that no WMDs existed, was hardly registered or tracked by the 
American public. The one photograph of Valerie Plame included in the sample pictured 
her with a coy and flirtatious mien, framing Plame in a stereotyped negative gendered 




style, thus supporting the Bush Administration’s contention that she was not a CIA 
operative. Only 23% of the American public said they paid close attention to the scandal. 
Despite slightly partisan opinions from the Democrat and Independent parties favoring 
resignation of Carl Rove for his suspected role in the scandal and the indictment of 
Scooter Libby, Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff, he political scandal did not affect 
attitudes about the war, according to a July 2005 survey (PEW, July 2005).  
 The visual framing of the Iraq War tended to follow the lead of the textual 
framing, most of which contextualized the war in an episodic and conventional U.S.-
centric manner. However, textual and visual counter-framing was a subtle way to 
undermine these conventions. Whether this counter-framing was exercised with editorial 
intent or not, it could be construed as a clever device to reveal uncertainty with official 
accounts of the war.  
Images Not Seen or Pictures Not Taken 
 While a war is traditionally tied to a “conflict frame” (Neuman et al., 1992) or as 
a “military conflict frame,” as Carpenter (2007) labels it in his analysis of newspaper 
coverage of the Iraq War, a conflict frame would suggest that at least two stakeholders 
with opposing objectives should be pictured. In this study not only was the coverage U.S. 
–centric, but also devoid of representations of allies or other stakeholders with alternative 
objectives, views, and solutions. An assumption of a conflict frame, however 
conventional, can be informative by revealing what is absent in a war’s representation, 
with the result that the photographs are not simply a t pe of visual communication; they 




are “the power to make visible” (Frosh, 2001, p. 43). As such, that which is not made 
visible does not count in the meaning making equation of war. 
 In an empirical study it is difficult to talk about images or photographs that are 
missing from the documentation of the war. We assume that if something is not part of 
the documentation that it did not exist. However, it is ncumbent on media scholars to 
question what is missing, either because we want to see some aspect of coverage that has 
not been included or should see some aspect of coverage that is glaringly missing. In this 
sense it is legitimate to ask what is not being shown. 
 The lack of photographs of civilians going about their daily lives or civilians in 
professional capacities is noteworthy. Civilian casualties are historically the highest 
during war. If we think of civilians as stakeholders in the outcome of war, then they are 
stakeholders that are not being pictured to the same extent that they are impacted by war. 
The embed system allowed for closer coverage of the military, but according to personal 
accounts by journalists, this did not necessarily translate into increased coverage of, or 
proximity to, civilians. At the start of the war, civilians felt safe talking to journalists, but 
because of embedding, journalists started to be considered part of the military and it 
became dangerous for civilians to talk to journalists for fear of being targeted by 
insurgents as sympathizers (Hoyt & Palattella, 2007, pp. 19-20). This suggests that aside 
from structural media processes and editorial pressu , what got pictured was also 
influenced by events on the ground and Iraqi cultura  assumptions about journalists in 




general, who, during the Saddam Hussein regime, were thought to work for Iraqi 
intelligence and were therefore avoided (Hoyt & Palatte la, 2007, p. 37).  
 Also noteworthy is the lack of photographs of American civilian contractors to 
whom the rebuilding of Iraq was outsourced. These multinational corporations, such as 
Bechtel and Halliburton received very little coverage and, with the exception of 
Blackwater security forces protecting Paul Bremer in his role as Administrator of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq, and the killing of Blackwater employees in 2004, 
there were no images of employees providing services that were formerly provided by the 
armed services itself, such as provisioning of water, food stuffs, and mess services, to the 
U.S. military. Given complaints about the effectiveness of these profit-motivated 
enterprises, it is noteworthy that coverage of these services was not included in visual 
representations of the war. Nor were reconstruction efforts by these corporations to 
restore water, sewer, and communication services to the Iraqi people visually represented.  
As mentioned before, particularly images of efforts to restore oil production were not 
pictured despite the Iraqi Oil Ministry in Baghdad being the only structure that was 
protected and guarded by U.S. and coalition troops at the beginning of the war (Hoyt & 
Palattella, 2007, p. 31). In order to interview officials of these international corporations, 
journalists had to get permission to enter the Green Zone, a highly fortified zone in 
central Baghdad. The Green Zone was the former site of the Republican Palace and 
during the Iraq War was the site of the Coalition Provisional Authority. It was also the 
base for international contractors such as Halliburton and Bechtel. The paperwork 




required for journalists to get into the Green Zone was extensive, sometimes taking two 
months to complete. According to some journalists, they were bureaucratically locked out 
of the Green Zone, and the Green Zone was isolated from the realities of what was 
happening in Iraq (Hoyt & Palattella, 2007, p. 52). 
 Political rhetoric at the beginning of the war in Afghanistan (2001) and the Iraq 
war (2003) connected these wars with the Crusades sugge ting the wars were also 
religious in nature. While there were some photographs of troops and civilians praying in 
primarily Christian and Muslim traditions, religious imagery did not dominate any of the 
categories. Of the 356 photographs in the sample, on y 7 included religious overtones 
through the inclusion of praying postures, or religious iconography. However, articles 
devoted to explicating Islam, the differences betwen different Muslim sects, or articles 
on Christianity were placed in close proximity to articles on the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in all three publications.  
 As discussed in the literature review, the visual framing of the Iraq War has 
implications for historical, cultural, and journalistic ways of constructing a dialogue 
about war’s meaning. It is historical in the sense that an accurate visual depiction of war 
does not get recorded at the time it is occurring. It is cultural in the sense that an 
understanding of the causes and complexity of a particular war are not distinguished from 
war tropes and mythologies that stand in for the realiti s of war (Hallin & Gitlin, 1993). 
Finally, it is journalistic in the sense that constraints on coverage during war should not 
interfere with the social responsibility of the journalist to inform the public (Allan & 




Zelizer, 2003). Embedding influenced what was covered, and sometimes acted as a form 
of indirect censorship. Embedding also influenced the perceptions of Iraqi civilians 
toward journalists, cutting off access to civilians as stakeholders in the picturing of the 
war, and eventually positioning journalists as targets themselves rather than third party 
objective observers. This had consequences for how t e ar was framed and counter-
framed. 
Limitations 
 The main internal limitation to the study, particularly as it concerns comparisons 
to the previous Gulf War study, is the possibility of different parameters for category 
inclusion. Particularly for the category “catalogin the arsenal,” the high count of Griffin 
and Lee’s (1995) study and the relatively low category count in this Iraq War study 
reflected a marked difference. In my post hoc review of the population of images used in 
the Gulf War study, and my lower count of “cataloging the arsenal” photographs using 
my categorization protocols makes the comparison of this particular category impossible. 
This study considered one graphic image containing many separate illustrations of 
armaments as one instance of the category. It is unknown if the same protocol was used 
in the Gulf War study. Similarly, this study considered “C-patrol” a combat category, and 
not “unengaged troops” as I suspect the Griffin andLee (1995) study did. Again, this is a 
possible difference in coding protocol that affects comparisons between studies.  
 As a sample of a larger census of photographs, this s udy captured the main 
events and themes of the Iraq War and is largely generalizable to the larger population of 




photographs in these news magazines. Despite this generalizability, there were gaps in 
coverage of particular events such as the U.S. and allie  phosphorus bombing of Fallujah 
in 2004. Concurrently, the results cannot be generaliz d to media coverage on different 
platforms such as television, extended coverage in onli e news magazines, blogs, or 
constructed pictorial accounts in books about the Iraq War.  
Implications for Future Research 
 Censorship protocols of the military will undoubtedly change in the future to 
control the use of smart phones by military personnel to document their experiences and 
possible publication to social media. In the future, f aming research will have to account 
for the effect that a lack of censorship exerts when individuals can disseminate 
information and transmit photographs immediately in some type of “direct-to-consumer” 
social networking process. By bypassing the traditional mass media discursive monopoly, 
the mechanisms of a mass media frame generation will be affected or become irrelevant 
(Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). Visual information may also have unintended consequences 
when the audience is a global audience with access to the Internet and conflicting 
interests. Because photographs have no propositional sy tax and can be contextually 
isolated, they can become meaning-making vehicles for opposing interests. 
 As the visual turn of news generation continues, more studies and surveys of the 
effects of visual materials can help to ascribe causal consequences, thought by Snow, 
Rochford, Worden, and Benford (1986) to be one of the goals of framing analysis. The 
PEW survey that included references to the Abu Ghraib visual materials is such an 




example (May, 2004), with respondents clearly influenced by the images and evaluating 
the arch of the war negatively because of them. Experimental models to evaluate the 
effects of images on publics with differing interests and stakes in a war will be crucial to 
an understanding of how the lack of propositional syntax in visual communication affects 
publics. Future research could also target the effect of grisly photography as it relates to 
war vs. natural disaster to assess whether the impact of this type of photography is related 
to qualitative aspects of the photography or to values associated with who or what is 
responsible for the represented tragedy or catastrophe. 
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Appendix A: Coding Categories 
 
Publication: Time                  Newsweek              U.S. News and World Report 
Date   
Volume (Issue)   
Section / Page   
Image No:   
Photographer / graphic artist   
Affiliation   
Source of photo / image   
Color / Black & White   
Size of photo: 2-pg. Spread   Full Page   Half Page    Quarter Page    < Quarter 
Headline   
Sub-head   
  Caption 
Pictorial Genre/Type of Image: U.S. Allied Iraq Other 
Political         
Military         
Civilian life         
Damage and Destruction         
Terrorism (emergent)         
DETAILS:         
Mode:         
Grisly – human(s) in extremis     
Archival file photos (government/ 
news agency, publication) 
        
Staged         
Posed (emergent)         
Infographics / Illustrations/ 
Graph/ Table 
        
Map         
DETAILS:         
People: U.S. Allied Iraq Other 
Political leaders         
Military leaders         
Terrorist leaders (emergent)         
Soldiers/Troops         
Veterans (emergent)         
POWs         
Civilians         
    Civilian Insurgents (emergent)         
    Women / Children         
    Protesters/Public 
demonstrations 
        









Combat         
C-Patrol (emergent)         
Behind the lines (Bivouac,         









        
Drones         
Casualties: U.S. Allied Iraq Other 
Political wounded (emergent)         
Political dead (emergent)         
Military wounded         
Military dead         
Civilian wounded         
Civilian dead         
Terrorist wounded (emergent)     
Terrorist dead (emergent)     
Ceremonial (funerals, dress 
uniform) 
        
    Coffins         
Destruction: U.S. Allied Iraq Other 
Infrastructure         
Oil and energy         
Ecological subjects         
Misc. Emergent Categories: U.S.   Iraq  
Political Misconduct     
Military Misconduct     
Political - Guantanamo     
  




Appendix B: Codebook 
Coding Protocols 
Coding Unit    The coding unit is one photograph 
 
Context Unit  Name of publication (Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World  
   Report) 
  
Categories  
The primary researcher will complete the information below: 
 
Date Published Date of the magazine edition, usually on the front cover.   
   Format: Month.Day.Year   xx/xx/xx 
 
Volume/ (Issue) The newsmagazine Volume and Issue numbers will be noted. 
  
Page No.  The newsmagazine page number on which the image appears. 
 
Image No.  Each photograph/image will be assigned a number before coders  
   come into contact with the coding document.   
  
Photographer  Name of the photographer (if listed) 
 
Affiliation  Name of the wire services, staff photographer or media corp.  
   Please note if this information is not available with NA. 
  
Source of Photo Name of the source of the photo.  Same as above unless noted as 
   archival or image from different source such as Getty Images,  
   US Government./Military, Defense Contractor (Raytheon,  
   McDonnell Douglas), etc. 
  
Color   Note whether a photograph is in color or black and white with the 
Black & White designation C or B/W. 
 
  
Size of Photo  The dimensions of the photograph as follows:  
   2-pg. spread / full / half  / quarter / < quarter 
 
Headline  Note the exact wording in the headline of the article.  
 




Subheading  Note the exact wording in the subhead of the article. 
 
Caption  Note the exact wording of the caption accompanying the image. 
     
   
  
 
Coders:    Please code a genre and as many details per photo as seem   
   appropriate. 
    
   If there is a photograph that you find particularly interesting, 
   please feel free to note your impressions somewhere on the 
   coding sheet. 
 
 
Type of Image (Pictorial Genre)  
 
Genre Codes:  Each photograph or image will usually have a focus that allows  
   it to be categorized as a certain genre.   
    
   One of the genre codes can usually be assigned to that photograph.   
   For example: A photograph that shows President Bush on a  
   battleship would only be coded as “political lead r” and not  
   additionally for the battleship or the troops that might be watching  
   the speech. It is clear from the centrality of President Bush’s  
   placement, that he is the subject of the photograph.  
 
   If an image is “political” and also a mode code “archival” image,  
   please check both of those codes. 
 
Detail Codes  Each photograph or image will also have details that should be  
   noted. See codes below: mode, people, cataloging the arsenal,  
















Political  A type of image whose focus is on political issues dealing with the  
   war and also political leaders. For example: indicte  political  
   players, or political leaders meeting dignitaries, giving a speech,  
   getting in a car or out of a helicopter, attending a meeting, etc.  
   Please differentiate between whether those pictured are:  
   U.S., Allied, or Iraqi political leaders and the name of the leader (if 
   known).   
    
   Leaders that are not allied leaders, such as Gerhard 
   Schröder of Germany, or Jacques Chirac of France, should be  
   listed under “Other.” If they are all in the same picture  
   together, then list everyone that is in the photograph. 
 
   There might be some questions regarding whether to code Colin 
   Powell as military or political. In this case, during the War in Iraq,  
   Colin Powell was a political appointee and therefor  should be   
   coded as political.   
  
   Likewise, Donald Rumsfeld, although he was Secretary of Defense 
   and oversaw the Pentagon, was a political appointee and 
   therefore should be coded as a political leader.   
  
Military  A type of photograph that centers on military activity. 
   
   This code also include leaders such as generals in the field or  
   behind the scenes. Please differentiate between U.S., Allied, and  
   Iraqi, or Other military leaders. Fill in a name if known or   
   available.        
    
   Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff and other such officers,  
   although they are political appointees, are advisors because they  
   have risen through the ranks of the military. Such advisors should  
   be coded as military. 
 
Wartime Civilian A type of photo that documents everyday life in Iraq or in America 
Life   or its Allies’ home countries. For example, people going to work,  
   school, church or mosque, et cetera.   
 
 




   This should NOT include images of civilians being detained or  
   questioned by troops (which should be coded as military). While 
   this questioning or searching someone’s home does “happen” 
   during wartime, it is not a daily occurrence for the civilian 
   population. I am more interested in documenting whether 
   photographs of people going to work/school or car ying on  
   with their lives are reflected in the corpus of photographs. 
 
   Protesters should not be included in this group. 
 
Damage and   A type of image whose focus is the destruction of infrastructure: 
Destruction  buildings, mosques, resources (oil/water/food), bridges, et cetera. 
  
Terrorism  A type of photograph that centers on terrorist activity and/or  
   leaders as identified by the media. This category should not  
   include civilian insurgents in Iraq despite their use of terrorist 




In addition to a genre code there will be details in the photograph that will be 




Grisly   A type of image that shows human(s) in extremis:  
   distressed, wounded, or dead soldiers or civilians. Again, please  
   differentiate between U.S., Allied, or Iraqi soldiers or civilians and 
   if a face is visible or a name published. 
 
Archival File Photos  A type of image used to illustrate something in the article, but does 
   not necessarily depict action on the ground in Iraq. It could be   
   from a previous war, or be of training going on in the US from a 
   different war. The main point is that the photo was not taken 
   close to the time it was published. 
 
Posed:   A type of image that is posed as in portraiture. A designation as  
   posed should not carry any negative connotation. Images of this  
   sort could occur in any genre. Politicians and military leaders  
   might be posed for a portrait for the cover of a m gazine and 




   might be less spontaneous than an action shot. Many times   
   posed photographs, or portraits of soldiers will stand in for them 
   if more spontaneous photos are not available or are considered 
   in bad taste, such as memorial photographs when they 
   have died. 
 
Staged:  There are photos that are staged to reenact a b ttle scene with no 
   intention to deceive. Usually these photos are accompanied by  
   some indication that the scene is staged or is from a past   
   war/conflict zone.  
   There are also some images that were originally published   
   and have since become known to be staged in the sense of “fake.”   
   They are intended to deceive or give a false impression. If you   
   notice such a photo, please make a note. One such example is the 
   toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue.   
     
Infographic,  A type of image that might illustrate an encampment or building,   
Illustration  an explanation of how a weapon works, or infographics 
   detailing the course of a battle. If the illustration depicts a weapon  
   or arsenal technology, the image will also be coded in that genre  
   category. 
     
Map   A type of image that shows the territory in which the war is taking 
   place, or the relationship between different groups, such as Sunnis, 
   Shi’ites, Kurds, et cetera.    




Political Leaders Political leaders of the U.S., Iraq, or Allied countries (see here: 
   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi-National_Force_–_Iraq 
     
Military Leaders Persons identifiable as a military leader through recognition,   
   caption, or text. Please write down the name of the military leader. 
  
Terrorist Leaders Usually internationally active individuals that use tactics of terror,  
   such as suicide bombings to attain political aims (This   
   definition is used in full recognition of the difficulty and ambiguity 
   of this term). Typically it is used to designate individuals whose 
   political aims are not allied with a particular state, but are more 
   ideological in nature. 
 




Soldiers/Troops An individual or group of soldier(s) or pilot(s) is pictured.  
   Typically even a single soldier can be referred to in the plural 
   as “troops.” 
         
POWs   Combatants that have been detained, shown captured, whether on 
   the battlefield or detained somewhere else. If they are detained  
   somewhere else, key words used might be “extraordina y   
   rendition” or simply “rendition.” Again, please differentiate 
   between U.S., Allied, or Iraqi combatants. 
 
Civilians  Any person pictured and not connected to the military. 
    Again, please differentiate between U.S., Allied, Iraqi, or Other  
   civilians. 
      
Civilian Insurgents Iraqi civilians (Sunni and/or Shi’ite, aka Shia) that used   
   guerilla tactics to fight against the change in power structure after 
   the democratic elections. Often these tactics targe  other 
   Iraqi civilians, civilian police, or U.S. armed forces. 
 
Veterans  U.S. veterans from former or current wars that are pictured 
   regarding veteran benefits, future plans, healing, adjusting 
   to civilian life, honoring other soldiers, runnig for political 
   office, et cetera. 
 
Protesters  Images that show civilians protesting against the war from any 
   country. Please indicate from which county. 
     
Women and/or Any photograph in which women and/or children are the main 
Children  focus of the image. Again, please differentiate between U.S.,   
   Allied, or Iraqi women and/or children.   
 
 
Types of Warfare and Weaponry 
Combat  A type of image that shows soldiers in direct active combat with  
   the enemy.  
    
   It should not include practicing behind the lines, which sometimes 
   can look like active combat. Again, please differentiate between  
   U.S., Allied (which ally), Iraqi, or Other combatants. 
    




C-Patrol  A designation as C-patrol should include soldiers on patrol,  
   advancing in the theater of operations, searching residences, or 
   individuals. 
     
   Again, please differentiate between U.S., Allied (which ally), or  
   Iraqi combatants. 
   
Behind the lines A type of image that documents soldiers behind the lines, relaxing, 
   exercising, training for combat, playing sports, et cetera.  
   
 
Weaponry/Arsenal This category is meant to keep track of images that seem to  
   list or “promote” the extensive firepower of the U.S. military. It is  
   NOT meant to include every instance in photographs or images  
   that include a tank or airplane. 
 
Jets/ Helicopters Graphic images/drawings, photographs or diagrams in which the 
Humvees/Tanks subject of the image is jets, airplanes, helicopters, humvees   
Naval Vessels  tanks, naval vessels, missiles, IEDs, EDs, et cetera. 
Missiles/ IEDs/ 
Electronic  
explosive devices  
     
 
Drones   Graphic images/drawings, photographs or diagrams in which the 
   subject of the image is drones used to deliver missiles, bombs or   
   surveillance technology.   
    
       
Casualties 
   
Political Wounded Photographs that include political ndividuals injured in the  
   performance of their duties. Please differentiate between U.S.,  
   Allied, Iraqi, or Other politicians.  
 
Political Dead  Photographs that include political ndividuals who were 
   assassinated or died in the performance of theirdut es or 
   because of their political role. Please  differentiate between U.S.,  
   Allied, Iraqi, or Other individuals. 
 
Military Wounded  Photographs that include soldiers njured on the battlefield or  
   recovering in a hospital. If in a hospital, pleas  indicate where the  




   hospital is located and please differentiate betwe n U.S., Allied,  
   Iraqi, or Other soldiers.  
    
Military Dead  Photographs that include dead soldiers in the field, in a morgue,  
   in a hospital, or represented by a funeral, casket, or symbolic 
   representations such as family photographs, et cet ra. 
   Please note in the space provided whether the face is 
   visible or covered and whether the body is exposed (naked) or not.   
   Please differentiate between U.S., Allies, Iraqi, or nsurgent, or  
   Other dead.  
 
Civilian Wounded Photographs that include injured civilians. Civilians are usually 
   referred to as “collateral damage,” civilians, or s me indication   
   that the subject of the photograph is not a member of military  
   personnel. The exception to this designation will be civilian  
   insurgents. Please note whether the pictured wounded are 
   civilians and/or civilian insurgents. 
 
Civilian Dead  Photographs that include dead civilians in a hospital, morgue,  
at a funeral, or on the street. Please note in the space provided 
whether the face is visible or covered and whether t  body is 
exposed (naked) or not. This detail code will include 
   civilian insurgents usually designated as such in t e caption. Please 
   make a note that those pictured are insurgents. 
    
Terrorist wounded Photographs that include injured terrorists, or those identified 
   as terrorists by the media. 
 
Terrorist dead  Photographs that include dead terrorists, or those identified as  
   terrorists by the media. This will include representative   
   photographs. Please note in the space provided wh ther the face is  
   visible or covered. 
 
Ceremonial  A type of photo that documents ceremonies such as military 
   honors, funerals, in Iraq or in America or its Allies’ home   
   countries.   
    
Also include the implied dead such as pictures of people grieving or pictures of 
coffins/graves. Please note that death is implied and how. Please differentiate between 
U.S., Allied, Iraqi civilians, or other (specify). 
 




From approximately 2004–2007, an Iraqi insurgency against coalition forces took place.  
Iraqis that collaborated with the U.S., such as police, were a prominent target, leading to 
large numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths.  
 
 
Destruction and Damage  
War Damage   Images that show the destruction of government buildings and  
   hospitals; cultural landmarks such as museums and mosques,  
   destruction of neighborhoods and interruptions of activities of  
   daily living such as going to school or work. 
 
Oil and Energy Images that show the destruction of oil fields, reserves, et cetera.   
        
Ecological Subjects Images that show the destruction of agriculture, water,   
   environment, and/or animals.  
 
 
Emergent Categories     
 If, while coding, you notice a category or a detail that you believe needs to be 
added to the code sheet, please contact me via email and we can discuss it with all coders 
and come to a consensus about what code to use for those types of images/details. 
Sometimes there will be details that can simply be added to the codes already assigned by 
adding it to the code area already supplied. 
 
Coding Decisions 
   Some of the photographs will include elements that suggest two genres. For 
instance, you might be coding a photograph that has 3 soldiers driving in a tank. You 
might wonder if you should code for both of those categories. The answer is NO. Very 
likely the main focal point of the photograph is the soldiers. You would then code it as 
“military” and would not code it for the vehicle. However, there might be a photograph 
of an aircraft carrier taken from a distance with troops lined up in formation on the deck. 
The prominence of the aircraft carrier and the relative diminutive nature of the troops 
should lead you to code the photograph as “naval vessel.” If however, you judge that the 
reason the photograph is taken from a distance is to show the size of a battalion, then it 
would be coded for troops. Sometimes the caption will indicate how the photograph 
should be read. 
               
            If, while coding, two genres seem relevant to a coding unit, please make your best 
decision and clarify why you feel that decision outweighs coding in another genre. Make 




a note of your second choice of genre. If continual questions arise, please contact me so 




   
 Coding questions or the application of a new emergent code will be resolved by 
finding consensus between all coders. If the question  are the result of instructions 
regarding the coding or categories, the codebook will be revised and further training 
provided.   
 
  




Appendix C: Tables 
 
Table 3 
Intercoder Agreement per Category Using Cohen’s Kappa 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Category  Total Agreement Coder 1 & 3 Coder 1 & 2 Coder 2 & 3 
 
Genre: 
Political–U.S. 0.975  1.000  0.962 1.000 
Political–Allied 0.333  0.000  1.000 0.000 
Political–Iraq 0.822  0.826  0.850 0.774 
Political–Other 0.775  0.663  1.000 0.663 
Military–U.S. 0.847  0.902  0.845 0.793 
Military–Allied 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
Military–Iraq 0.363  0.387  0.387 0.315 
Civilians–U.S. 0.534  0.558  0.658 0.387 
Civilians–Iraq 0.785  0.762  0.854 0.738 
Terrorism–Iraq 0.130  0.000  0.391 0.000 
Terrorism–Other 0.827  1.000  0.741 0.741 
Destruction–Iraq 0.923  0.884  1.000 0.884 
Destruction–Other 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000      
     Genre Subtotal 0.720  0.690  0.820 0.640 
 
Mode: 
Archival–U.S. 0.779  0.799  0.673 1.000 
Archival–Iraq 0.164  0.000  0.493 0.000 
Info-graphics–U.S. 0.826  0.741  0.853 0.884 
Info-graphics–Iraq 0.749  0.741  0.653 0.853 
Map–Iraq 0.815  0.741  0.853 0.853 
 Mode Subtotal 0.670  0.600  0.710 0.720 
 
People: 
Political leader–U.S. 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
Political leader–Iraq 0.815  0.865  0.847 0.731 
Political leader–Other 0.662  0.493  1.000 0.493 
Military leader–U.S. 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
Terrorist–Other 0.775  0.663  1.000 0.663 
Soldiers/Troops–U.S. 0.905  0.882  0.976 0.856 
Soldiers/Troops–Allied 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
Soldiers/Troops–Iraq 0.707  1.000  0.560 0.560 
Soldiers/Troops–Other 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
Combat–U.S. 0.827  1.000  0.741 0.741 
C-Patrol–U.S. 0.713  0.904  0.582 0.653 
C-Patrol–Iraq 0.769  0.658  0.853 0.796 
Grisly–U.S. 0.660  1.000  0.491 0.491 
Grisly–Iraq 0.975  0.962  0.962 1.000 









Intercoder Agreement per Category using Cohen’s Kappa (continued) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Category  Average Agreement Coder 1 & 3 Coder 1 & 2 Coder 2 & 3 
People: 
Behind-the-Lines–Allied 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
Veterans–U.S. 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
P.O.W.–Iraq 0.936  0.904  0.904 1.000 
Civilian life – Iraq 0.850  0.780  0.890 0.879 
Civilian life–Other 0.775  0.663  1.000 0.663 
Insurgents–Iraq 0.826  0.884  0.853 0.741 
Protesters–Iraq 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
Protesters–Other 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
Women & Children–U.S. 0.864  0.796  1.000 0.796 
Women & Children–Iraq 0.884  0.960  0.826 0.865 
  People Subtotal 0.870  0.880  0.890 0.830 
 
Arsenal: 
Cataloging the Arsenal–U.S. 0.902  0.853  0.853 1.000 
Drones–U.S. 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
 Arsenal Subtotal 0.950  0.930  0.930 1.000 
 
Casualties: 
Political Dead–Iraq 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
Military Wounded–U.S. 0.826  0.884  0.741 0.853 
Military Dead–U.S. 0.936  1.000  0.904 0.904 
Military Dead–Iraq 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
Civilian Wounded–Iraq 0.902  0.853  1.000 0.853 
Civilian Wounded–Other 0.333  0.000  0.000 1.000 
Civilian Dead–Iraq 0.776  0.790  0.884 0.653 
Civilian Dead–Other 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
Ceremonial–U.S. 0.864  1.000  0.796 0.796 
Coffins–U.S. 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
Coffins–Iraq 0.333  0.000  1.000 0.000 
 Casualty Subtotal 0.820  0.780  0.850 0.820 
 
Damage & Destruction: 
Destruction–U.S. 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
Destruction–Iraq 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
Destruction–Other 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
 Damage Subtotal 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
 
Emergent Categories  
Military Misconduct–U.S.          0.940  0.910  1.000   0.910 
 Emergent Subtotal 0.940  0.910  1.000 0.910 
 










Statistical Significance of Iraq War Categorical Reationships 
Category n = 356 df = 1 Chi Square*   
 
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Military  .783  
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Military Leaders  .536  
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Troops  .378  
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Behind the lines troops  .137  
U.S. Political Leader / U.S Combat  .378 
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Combat Patrol  .087  
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Military Wounded  .277 
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Military Dead  .313 
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Veteran  .783 
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Military Misconduct  .294 
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Armaments  .313  
 
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Military  .879  
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Military Leaders  .733  
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Troops  .627  
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Behind the Lines Troops  .412  
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Combat  .627  
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Combat Patrol  .345  
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Military Wounded  .549  
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Military Dead  .578  
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Veteran  .879  
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Military Misconduct  .563  
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Armaments  .578  
 
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Military  .915 
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Military Leaders  .810 
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Troops .732 
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Behind the Lines Troops .564 
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Combat .732  
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Combat Patrol .507 
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Military Wounded .673 
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Military Dead .695 
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Veteran .915 
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Military Misconduct .684 
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Armaments .695 
 
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Military  .896 
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Military Leaders  .786 
 
  
                                                
* Note. All calculations based on n=356 and df =1. All Chi Square calculations are not significant (n.s.) 
unless marked with an asterisk (*) indicating values <.05, thus significant. 






Statistical Significance of Iraq War Categorical Relationships 
 
 
Category n = 356 df = 1 Chi Square*  
 
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Behind the Lines Troops .479 
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Combat .675 
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Combat Patrol .415 
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Military Wounded .604 
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Military Dead .631 
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Veteran .896 
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Military Misconduct .617 
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Armaments .631 
 
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Military  .958  
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Military Leaders  .905  
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Troops .865 
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Behind the lines troops .774 
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Combat .865 
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Combat Patrol .741 
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Military Wounded .834 
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Military Dead .845 
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Veterans .958 
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Military Misconduct .839 
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Armaments .845 
 
U.S. Political Leader / Iraq Political   .354 
U.S. Political Leader / Iraq Political Leader   .218 
U.S. Political Leader / Iraq Protesters  .697 
U.S. Political Leader / Iraq Political Dead .783 
U.S. Political Leader / Iraq Political Misconduct .580 
 
U.S. Political Misconduct / Iraq Political .609 
U.S. Political Misconduct / Iraq Political Leader .497 
U.S. Political Misconduct / Iraq Protesters .830 
U.S. Political Misconduct / Iraq Political Dead .879 
U.S. Political Misconduct / Iraq Political Misconduct .760 
 
U.S. Protesters / Iraq Political .719 
U.S. Protesters / Iraq Political Leader .633 
U.S. Protesters / Iraq Protesters .880 
U.S. Protesters / Iraq Political Dead .915 
U.S. Protesters / Iraq Political Misconduct .830 
  






Statistical Significance of Iraq War Categorical Relationships 
 
 
Category n = 356 df = 1 Chi Square*  
 
U.S. Political Guantanamo / Iraq Political .659 
U.S. Political Guantanamo / Iraq Political Leader .557 
U.S. Political Guantanamo / Iraq Protesters .853 
U.S. Political Guantanamo / Iraq Political Dead .897 
U.S. Political Guantanamo / Iraq Political Misconduct .000 
 
U.S. Political Dead / Iraq Political .858 
U.S. Political Dead / Iraq Political Leader .812 
U.S. Political Dead / Iraq Protesters .940 
U.S. Political Dead / Iraq Political Dead .958 
U.S. Political Dead / Iraq Political Misconduct .915 
 
Allied Political Leader / Iraq Political .800 
Allied Political Leader / Iraq Political Leader .736 
Allied Political Leader / Iraq Protesters .915 
Allied Political Leader / Iraq Political Dead .940 
Allied Political Leader / Iraq Political Misconduct .880 
 
Allied Protesters / Iraq Political .858 
Allied Protesters / Iraq Political Leader .812 
Allied Protesters / Iraq Protesters .940 
Allied Protesters / Iraq Political Dead .958 
Allied Protesters / Iraq Political Misconduct .915 
 
U.S. Military / Iraq Military .958 
U.S. Military / Iraq Troops .940 
U.S. Military / Iraq Patrol .958 
U.S. Military / Iraq Insurgents .852 
U.S. Military / Iraq POW .958 
U.S. Military / Iraq Arsenal .940 
U.S. Military / Iraq Military Misconduct .926 
 
U.S. Military Leader / Iraq Military .905 
U.S. Military Leader / Iraq Troops .866 
U.S. Military Leader / Iraq Patrol .905 
U.S. Military Leader / Iraq Insurgents .674 
U.S. Military Leader / Iraq POW .905 
U.S. Military Leader / Iraq Arsenal .866 
U.S. Military Leader / Iraq Military Misconduct .836 
 
U.S. Troops / Iraq Military .865 
U.S. Troops / Iraq Troops .809 
U.S. Troops / Iraq Patrol .865 
U.S. Military / Iraq Insurgents .549 






Statistical Significance of Iraq War Categorical Relationships 
 
 
Category n = 356 df = 1 Chi Square*  
 
U.S. Troops / Iraq POW .865 
U.S. Troops / Iraq Arsenal .809 
U.S. Troops / Iraq Military Misconduct .767 
 
U.S. Behind the Lines / Iraq Military .774 
U.S. Behind the Lines / Iraq Troops .685 
U.S. Behind the Lines / Iraq Patrol .774 
U.S. Behind the Lines / Iraq Insurgents .313 
U.S. Behind the Lines / Iraq POW .774 
U.S. Behind the Lines / Iraq Arsenal .685 
U.S. Behind the Lines / Iraq Military Misconduct .618 
 
U.S. Combat / Iraq Military .865 
U.S. Combat / Iraq Troops .809 
U.S. Combat / Iraq Patrol .865 
U.S. Combat / Iraq Insurgents .549 
U.S. Combat / Iraq POW .865 
U.S. Combat / Iraq Arsenal .809 
U.S. Combat / Iraq Military Misconduct .767 
 
U.S. Patrol / Iraq Military .741 
U.S. Patrol / Iraq Troops .640 
U.S. Patrol / Iraq Patrol .741 
U.S. Patrol / Iraq Insurgents .245 
U.S. Patrol / Iraq POW .741 
U.S. Patrol / Iraq Arsenal .640 
U.S. Patrol / Iraq Military Misconduct .566 
 
U.S. Military Wounded / Iraq Military .834 
U.S. Military Wounded / Iraq Troops .766 
U.S. Military Wounded / Iraq Patrol .834 
U.S. Military Wounded / Iraq Insurgents .460 
U.S. Military Wounded / Iraq POW .834 
U.S. Military Wounded / Iraq Arsenal .766 
U.S. Military Wounded / Iraq Military Misconduct .715 
 
U.S. Military Dead / Iraq Military .845 
U.S. Military Dead / Iraq Troops .782 
U.S. Military Dead / Iraq Patrol .845 
U.S. Military Dead / Iraq Insurgents .493 
U.S. Military Dead / Iraq POW .845 
U.S. Military Dead / Iraq Arsenal .782 
U.S. Military Dead / Iraq Military Misconduct .735 
 






Statistical Significance of Iraq War Categorical Relationships 
 
 
Category n = 356 df = 1 Chi Square*  
  
U.S. Military Misconduct / Iraq Military .839 
U.S. Military Misconduct / Iraq Troops .774 
U.S. Military Misconduct / Iraq Patrol .839 
U.S. Military Misconduct / Iraq Insurgents .476 
U.S. Military Misconduct / Iraq POW .839 
U.S. Military Misconduct / Iraq Arsenal .774 
U.S. Military Misconduct / Iraq Military Misconduct .725 
 
U.S. Armaments / Iraq Military .845 
U.S. Armaments / Iraq Troops .782 
U.S. Armaments / Iraq Patrol .845 
U.S. Armaments / Iraq Insurgents .493 
U.S. Armaments / Iraq POW .845 
U.S. Armaments / Iraq Arsenal .782 
U.S. Armaments / Iraq Military Misconduct .735 
 
Allied Patrol / Iraq Military .958 
Allied Patrol / Iraq Troops .940 
Allied Patrol / Iraq Patrol .958 
Allied Patrol / Iraq Insurgents .852 
Allied Patrol / Iraq POW .958 
Allied Patrol / Iraq Arsenal .940 
Allied Patrol / Iraq Military Misconduct .926 
 
Allied Behind the Lines / Iraq Military .926 
Allied Behind the Lines / Iraq Troops .896 
Allied Behind the Lines / Iraq Patrol .926 
Allied Behind the Lines / Iraq Insurgents .745 
Allied Behind the Lines / Iraq POW .926 
Allied Behind the Lines / Iraq Arsenal .896 
Allied Behind the Lines / Iraq Military Misconduct .873 
 
Iraq Military / Iraq Civilians .693 
Iraq Military / Iraq Civilian Wounded .896 
Iraq Military / Iraq Civilian Dead .905 
   
Iraq Troops / Iraq Civilians .576 
Iraq Troops / Iraq Civilian Wounded .853  
Iraq Troops / Iraq Civilian Dead .866 
 
Iraq Patrol / Iraq Civilians .693 
Iraq Patrol / Iraq Civilian Wounded .896 
Iraq Patrol / Iraq Civilian Dead .905 
 






Statistical Significance of Iraq War Categorical Relationships 
 
 
Category n = 356 df = 1 Chi Square*  
 
Iraq POWs / Iraq Civilians .693 
Iraq POWs / Iraq Civilian Wounded .896 
Iraq POWs / Iraq Civilian Dead .905 
 
Iraq Arsenal/ Iraq Civilians .576 
Iraq Arsenal / Iraq Civilian Wounded .853 
Iraq Arsenal / Iraq Civilian Dead .866 
 
Iraq Insurgents / Iraq Civilians .041* 
Iraq Insurgents / Iraq Civilian Wounded .645 
Iraq Insurgents / Iraq Civilian Dead .674 
 
Iraq Arsenal/ Iraq Civilians .576 
Iraq Arsenal / Iraq Civilian Wounded .853 
Iraq Arsenal / Iraq Civilian Dead .866 
 
Iraq Military Misconduct / Iraq Civilians .492 
Iraq Military Misconduct / Iraq Civilian Wounded .820 
Iraq Military Misconduct / Iraq Civilian Dead .836 
 
Iraq Military / Iraq Terrorism .896 
Iraq Military / Iraq Terrorist .958 
Iraq Military / Other Terrorism .958 
Iraq Military / Other Terrorist .958  
 
Iraq Troops / Iraq Terrorism .853 
Iraq Troops / Iraq Terrorist .950 
Iraq Troops / Other Terrorism .940  
Iraq Troops / Other Terrorist .940 
 
Iraq Patrol / Iraq Terrorism .896 
Iraq Patrol / Iraq Terrorist .958 
Iraq Patrol / Other Terrorism .958 
Iraq Patrol / Other Terrorist .958 
 
  






Statistical Significance of Iraq War Categorical Relationships 
 
 
Category n = 356 df = 1 Chi Square*  
 
Iraq Insurgents / Iraq Terrorism .645 
Iraq Insurgents / Iraq Terrorist .852 
Iraq Insurgents / Other Terrorism .000 
Iraq Insurgents / Other Terrorist .852 
 
Iraq POWs / Iraq Terrorism .896 
Iraq POWs / Iraq Terrorist .958 
Iraq POWs / Other Terrorism .958 
Iraq POWs / Other Terrorist .958 
 
Iraq Arsenal / Iraq Terrorism .853 
Iraq Arsenal / Iraq Terrorist .940 
Iraq Arsenal / Other Terrorism .940 
Iraq Arsenal / Other Terrorist .940 
 
Iraq Military Misconduct / Iraq Terrorism .820 
Iraq Military Misconduct / Iraq Terrorist .926 
Iraq Military Misconduct / Other Terrorism .926 
Iraq Military Misconduct / Other Terrorist .926 
 
Destruction U.S. / Destruction Iraq .725 
Destruction U.S. / Destruction Oil .926 
Destruction Other / Destruction Iraq .684 
Destruction Other / Destruction Oil .915 
 
U.S. Military Misconduct / U.S. Military .839 
U.S. Military Misconduct / U.S. Military Leader  .649 
U.S. Military Misconduct / U.S. Troops .516 
U.S. Military Misconduct / U.S. Behind the Lines .274 
U.S. Military Misconduct / U.S. Combat .516 
U.S. Military Misconduct / U.S. Patrol .207 
U.S. Military Misconduct / U.S. Military Wounded .423 
U.S. Military Misconduct / U.S. Military Dead .457 





        
 
  






High Frequency Categories in Gulf War Pictures in Newsmagazines2 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Category / Genre Images Percent 
 
Arsenal (U.S., Allied) 249 23% 
Troops (Noncombat–U.S., Allied) 158 14% 
Political Leaders (U.S.: Bush) 80 7% 
Military Leaders (U.S.) 59 5% 
Political Leaders (Iraq: Hussein) 47 4% 
Arsenal (Iraq) 40 4% 
Combat (All nations) 38 3% 
Destruction (Iraq) 37 3% 
Media (U.S.) 36 3% 
Civilian life (U.S.) 36 3% 
POWs (U.S.–Allied) 32 3% 




                                                
2 Table from Griffin and Lee’s study published in 1995. 





Low Frequency Categories in Gulf War Pictures in Newsmagazines3 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Category / Genre Images Percent 
 
Military Casualties 27 2% 
Damage and Destruction (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) 27 2% 
Prisoners of War (Iraqi) 22 2% 
Political Leaders (Arab world, excluding Iraq) 19 2% 
Public Demonstrations (U.S.) 19 2% 
War Time Civilian Life (Kuwait) 19 2% 
Oil and Energy 15 1% 
Public Demonstrations (Arab) 14 1% 
Political Leaders (Soviet, Iranian, Chinese, U.N.) 13 1% 
Civilian Casualties (Iraqi) 13 1% 
Ecological Subjects 12 1% 
Palestinian Leaders, Activists, Protesters 10 1% 
War Time Civilian Life (Iraqi) 8 1% 
War Inflicted Damage and Destruction (Israel) 7 .6% 
Civilian Casualties (Saudi, Kuwaiti, Israel) 6 .5% 
Military Casualties (Iraqi) 6 .5% 
Troops (Iraqi) 5 <.5% 
Wartime Civilian Life (Israel and Occupied Territory) 5 <.5% 
Iranian Activists or Protesters 4 <.5% 
Wartime Civilian Life (Saudi Arabia) 2 <.5% 
Public Demonstrations (Other Allied) 1 <.5% 
Military Casualties (Saudi, Egyptian, British, French) 1 <.5% 
Military Leaders (Iraqi) 0 0% 
Other 7 .6% 
 
 
                                                
3 Table from Griffin and Lee’s study published in 1995. 
